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I. INTRODUCTION
One might at first blush assume that the criminal offense of mail
fraud is an offense centrally focused around fraudulent mailings. In its
inception, the mail fraud statute combated crimes of fraud accom-
plished by use of the postal system.1 The postal system served as the
crux of the offense, with consideration of the "scheme" examined only
after meeting this first threshold.
2
Although a "mailing" is still necessary to procure a mail fraud con-
viction, the emphasis of the offense has shifted, drastically reducing
the focus on the use of the postal system.3 Today, prosecutors can ob-
tain convictions for mail fraud with innocent mailings,4 with mailings
dispatched after completion of the alleged scheme,5 and when someone
other than the defendant deposits the mailings.6 Mail fraud, described
by Jed Rakoff in 1980 as the prosecutor's Stradivarius or Colt 45,7 has
in 1992 become the prosecutor's Uzi.
This Article dissects the mail fraud statute, examining briefly its
historical origins. It then concentrates on new developments to the
crime of mail fraud, namely a legislative enactment that redefines
"scheme or artifice to defraud" to include the "intangible right of hon-
est services" and case law that enlarges the "in furtherance" element
1. Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 283, 323; see infra notes 11-12 and
accompanying text.
2. See generally Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (pt. 1), 18 DuQ.
L. REv. 771, 784 (1980) (explaining that apparent function of statute was to deter actual
and intentional misuse of mails in furtherance of a truly mail fraud scheme).
3. See Donald V. Morano, The Mail-Fraud Statute: A Procrustean Bed, 14 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 45, 47 (1980) (explaining that courts have been able to construe the
statute to fit virtually any deceptive conduct).
4. See Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 394 (1916).
5. See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 712 (1989).
6. See Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954); Joseph E. Edwards, Annota-
tion, What Constitutes "Causing" Mail To Be Delivered for Purpose of Executing
Scheme Prohibited by Mail Fraud Statute (18 U.S.C. § 1341), 9 A.L.R. FED. 893, 901
(1971).
7. Rakoff, supra note 2, at 771.
8. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603(a), 102 Stat. 4181,
4508 (codified at 18 U.S.C,A. § 1346 (West Supp. 1991)).
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of the statute.9 This Article highlights the confusion and ambiguity
caused by these statutory and case-law modifications. It argues that
mail fraud, while moving further from its roots, has reached a level
that permits its haphazard application to a wide spectrum of criminal
conduct. This Article calls for legislative modification and restructur-
ing of the statute, coupled with strict interpretation by the courts, to
transform the existing "stopgap" 10 provision into a recognizable crime.
II. ELEMENTS
The crime of mail fraud emanates from an 1872 recodification of
the Postal Act. 1 The initiation of this criminal offense generated no
congressional debate and therefore no legislative history.12 This precur-
sor to the current statute defined mail fraud to include a "scheme or
artifice to defraud" by means of the "post-office establishment of the
United States.""s
Section 1341 of title 18 of the United States Code contains the
9. See infra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
10. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405-06 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(explaining that when a new fraud develops, the statute becomes a stopgap device to
deal with the new phenomenon until Congress can develop legislation to deal with the
new fraud).
11. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
12. Rakoff, supra note 2, at 779.
13. The 1872 statute stated at § 301:
That if any person having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice
to defraud, or be effected by either opening or intending to open correspon-
dence or communication with any other person (whether resident within or
outside of the United States), by means of the post-office establishment of the
United States, or by inciting such other person to open communication with
the person so devising or intending, shall, in and for executing such scheme or
artifice (or attempting so to do), place any letter or packet in any post-office of
the United States, or take or receive any therefrom, such person, so misusing
the post-office establishment, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be
punished with a fine of not more than five hundred dollars, with or without
such imprisonment, as the court shall direct, not exceeding eighteen calendar
months. The indictment, information, or complaint may severally charge of-
fences to the number of three when committed within the same six calendar
months; but the court thereupon shall give a single sentence, and shall propor-
tion the punishment especially to the degree in which the abuse of the post-
office establishment enters as an instrument into such fraudulent scheme and
device.
Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 283, 323 (current version at 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 1341 (West Supp. 1991)). Congress modified the statute several times. Most significant
was the 1909 amendment, which added the language "or for obtaining money or property
by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises." Act of Mar. 4,
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current statutory foundation for the crime of mail fraud.14 Although a
"scheme or artifice to defraud" is still a pivotal aspect of tle crime, the
emphasis on illicit letters and circulars is noticeably omitted. The ele-
ments of the present-day offense are: 1) a scheme devised or intending
to defraud or for obtaining money or property by fraudulent means,
and 2) use or causing the use of the mails in furtherance of the fraudu-
lent scheme.15
The first element of the crime of mail fraud affords charges on an
array of possible schemes to defraud, including both intangible prop-
erty and intangible rights. In contrast, the second element of the crime
of mail fraud has three subparts that do not operate in the alternative:
a) a mailing, b) by the defendant or caused to be mailed by the defend-
ant, and c) in furtherance of a scheme to defraud.
A. First Element-Scheme to Defraud
The first element, the scheme to defraud, encompasses a myriad
and ever expanding number of frauds.16 It is an anomaly that criminal
14. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West Supp. 1991).
15. Section 1341 states:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to de-
fraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pre-
tenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter,
give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any coun-
terfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything repre-
sented to be or-intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article,
for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do,
places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter
or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or takes or
receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be deliv-
ered by mail according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is
directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such mat-
ter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both. If the violation affects a financial institution, such person
shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years,
or both.
Id.
16. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (securities fraud);
United States v. Serlin, 538 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1976) (franchise fraud); United States v.
Edwards, 458 F.2d 875 (5th Cir.) ("divorce mill" fraud), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 891
(1972); United States v. Andreadis, 366 F.2d 423 (2d Cir. 1966) (diet drug fraud), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1001 (1967); Mishan v. United States, 345 F.2d 790 (5th Cir. 1965) (fire
insurance fraud); Virginia L. Flick, Case Note, 31 VILL. L. REv. 1098 (1986); see generally
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Metastasis of Mail Fraud: The Continuing Story of the "Evolu-
tion" of a White-Collar Crime, 21 AM. CR1m. L. REv. 1 (1983) (claiming that reach of
statute continues to extend to areas not previously thought to be subject to criminal law
of fraud). Mail fraud charges recently were filed against owners of a pet cemetery ac-
[Vol. 43
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conduct is excluded as not within the realm of the statute.17 The
"scheme to defraud" element of mail fraud has clearly been the victim
of opened letters. This has occurred on three levels: legislative action,
judicial interpretation, and legislative reaction to the judiciary's
rulings.
The initial 1872 mail fraud statute merely prohibited "any scheme
or artifice to defraud" the postal system, thus providing virtually no
guidance within the statute as to the scope of the offense.18 A disparity
appeared among courts' rulings during the infancy of the mail fraud
statute, with some courts reading the statute literally and others ad-
vancing a comprehensive approach. 19 In reaction to these court opin-
ions, Congress modified the mail fraud statute, specifically listing the
schemes that they desired to be encompassed by the Act.20
The descriptiveness of this 1889 statutory modification was fol-
lowed by a Supreme Court decision that extended mail fraud even fur-
ther than the limitations placed upon it by the statute's terminology.
2 1
Mail fraud would now include not only past and present frauds, but
future acts to defraud.22 Legislative reaction to this ruling included a
codification of the United States Supreme Court's interpretation, thus
providing an even stronger foundation for extending mail fraud.
2 3
The development of the "scheme to defraud" element of mail
fraud reached a level of significant controversy during the 1980s. In the
decades immediately preceding the 1980s, prosecutors used the crime
of mail fraud to pursue political malfeasance. They argued that the
"scheme to defraud" element of mail fraud included intangible rights
to good government. 24 McNally v. United States,25 the prosecutor's
cused of scheming to cheat pet owners, veterinarians, and animal hospitals. Patricia
Hurtado, LI Pet Cemetery Owner Arraigned, NEWSDAY, Sept. 14, 1991, pt. II, at 6.
17. See Fasulo v. United States, 272 U.S. 620 (1926) (holding that scheme to de-
fraud does not include threats of murder or bodily harm).
18. See Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 283, 323 (current version at 18
U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West Supp. 1991)).
19. See Rakoff, supra note 2, at 790-801 (discussing cases that have used the strict
constructionist and the broad constructionist approaches); see also Ellen S. Podgor, Tax
Fraud-Mail Fraud: Synonymous, Cumulative or Diverse?, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 903, 905-06
(1989) (noting different interpretations).
20. Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 393, § 5480, 25 Stat. 873 (current version at 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 1341 (West Supp. 1991)). This detailed mail fraud statute listed schemes such as the
"sawdust swindle" and "counterfeit money fraud." Id.
21. Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306 (1896).
22. See id. at 313.
23. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 215, 35 Stat. 1088, 1130 (current version at
18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West Supp. 1991)); McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 357-58
(1987).
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"bombshell," 6 destroyed this intangible rights application. In McNally
the Supreme Court held that the mail fraud statute required a finding
of money or property to satisfy the "scheme to defraud" element.
Shortly after the McNally decision the Supreme Court accepted and
decided a second case, Carpenter v. United States.27 In Carpenter the
Court held that although money or property is a crucial facet of a mail
fraud action, the money or property could be intangible in nature, such
as the misuse of confidential information.
2
Within a year there was legislative reaction to the McNally and
Carpenter opinions. Congress added a new definitional section to the
mail fraud statute that effectively voided the McNally holding. The
amendment, section 1346 of title 18, states that a "'scheme or artifice
to defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the in-
tangible right of honest services. "29 Thus, schemes to defraud can now
include traditional frauds3" or yet-to-be determined deprivations of in-
tangible rights to honest government.3 1
Implicit within the "scheme to defraud" element of the crime of
mail fraud is an intent by the defendant to commit the fraud. Al-
though it is universally accepted that proof of an actual fraud is not
necessary,32 courts have required that the defendant contemplate a de-
frauding to meet the requisite mens rea.33 Some courts have demanded
proof of specific intent to support this aspect of a mail fraud charge.34
25. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
26. Neil A. Kaplan, The Convictions That Weren't: How the McNally Bombshell
is Exploding in the Prosecution's Face, A.BA SEC. CraM. JUST., Winter 1988, at 4, 4.
27. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
28. Id. at 25-26; see generally Eli Lederman, Criminal Liability for Breach of Con-
fidential Commercial Information, 38 EMORY L.J. 921, 985-96 (1989) (discussing trend in
Supreme Court to recognize confidential information as property).
29. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1346 (West. Supp. 1991).
30. See Giannina Lynn, Note, Mail and Wire Fraud, 26 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 931, 934-
36 (1989).
31. See generally Gregory H. Williams, Good Government by Prosecutorial De-
cree: The Use and Abuse of Mail Fraud, 32 ARiz. L. REv. 137 (1990) (criticizing the
expansion of the offense beyond traditional notions of fraud and the resulting vagueness
and uncertainty about the scope of the mail fraud offense).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Andreadis, 366 F.2d 423, 431 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1001 (1967).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Regent Office Supply Co., 421 F.2d 1174 (2d Cir.
1970) (holding that intent to deceive is insufficient and that defendant must have intent
to defraud).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Gelb, 700 F.2d 875, 879 (2d Cir.) (holding that al-
though a defendant must prove specific intent, it can be demonstrated through defend-
ant's actions or circumstantial evidence), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 853 (1983); see also
United States v. Martin-Trigona, 684 F.2d 485, 492 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that specific
intent is required in mail fraud).
[Vol. 43
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Others, however, have found mail fraud applicable when the conduct is
merely "reckless" or when the defendant acts with "willful blind-
ness."3 5 Irrespective of the standard of intent, courts uniformly have
found that a defendant's intent can be inferred from the evidence.3 8
B. Second Element-Mailing in Furtherance of Scheme
Although the language of the original mail fraud statute required
that the offense be "by means of the post-office establishment, '37 to-
day's version of this crime merely requires that the defendant use the
mails at some point in furtherance of the scheme.38 As previously
noted, this second element has three subparts.
The first subpart, the mailing, is merely the jurisdictional object
that brings the fraudulent conduct within the statute. Little, if any,
controversy surrounds the definition of "mailing." Litigation involving
nonpostal mailings or hand deliveries is conspicuously absent. Al-
though the argument has been made that the delivery could have been
effectuated "in person" rather than through the use of the United
States Postal System, this argument has been given little credence be-
cause it is premised upon mere speculation when, in fact, the United
States Postal System has been used.39
The second subpart is the defendant's act of mailing or causing
35. See generally Michael C. Smith, Recklessness and Good Faith Under the Mail
Fraud Statute: Mens Rea by Accident?, 27 CRim. L. BULL. 315, 315-26 (1991) (discussing
the decisions that have adopted a recklessness or willful blindness approach).
36. See, e.g., Gelb, 700 F.2d at 879 (holding that although specific intent is re-
quired for mail fraud, it can be inferred from the evidence). Recently, the First Circuit
Court of Appeals noted that although good faith serves as a legitimate defense to a
charge of mail fraud, a defendant is not entitled to an instruction pertaining to good
faith. See United States v. Dockray, 943 F.2d 152, 154-56 (1st Cir. 1991). It noted that
mail fraud's intent cannot be equated with the willfulness requirement in a tax evasion
case. Id. at 155-56. Thus, the reversal in Cheek v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 604 (1991),
for failure to properly instruct a jury to use the defendant's objective intent for evaluat-
ing "willfulness," is inapplicable to mail fraud's requirement that the defendant intend a
scheme to defraud. Dockray, 943 F.2d at 156.
37. Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 283, 323 (current version at 18
U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West Supp. 1991)).
38. The actual language of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 is: "for the purpose of executing such
scheme." However, most courts state this requirement as "in furtherance" of the scheme
to defraud. See, e.g., United States v. Draiman, 784 F.2d 248, 251 (7th Cir. 1986); see
also 9 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-43.221 (Theodore B. Olson et al. eds., Supp.
1989) (stating that "in furtherance" requirement is loosely construed by the courts)
[hereinafter JUSTIcE MANUAL].
39. See United States v. Flaxman, 495 F.2d 344, 348 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1031 (1974). Because courts originally required mailings to be essential to the fraud-
ulent scheme, arguments that the defendant could have effected delivery without use of
the mails enjoyed some success. See United States v. Clark, 121 F. 190 (M.D. Pa. 1903).
19921
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the item to be mailed. Some controversy has entered this aspect of the
crime when the defendant does not personally mail the letter. The
United States Supreme Court, however, has firmly held that an indict-
ment may be predicated upon a defendant's agent using the mail.'0
The Supreme Court resolved any ambiguity in 1954 when it stated a
test that presumes sufficiency of the defendant using the mail when
the defendant acts with knowledge that the mails will be used or if the
use of the mails can be reasonably foreseen.41
The final subpart, the heart of this element of the ofense, is that
the defendant's mailing be in furtherance of the scheme to defraud. To
satisfy the causal connection between the mailing and the scheme,
courts originally required a subjective showing that the mailing was es-
sential to the scheme.42 Essentiality later was modified by the Court to
be merely incidental.' s Subjective review was eliminated and courts
were left to objectively determine if the scheme was "closely related"
to the mailing."
40. See United States v. Kenofskey, 243 U.S. 440 (1917) (interpreting "place, or
cause to be placed" language in mail fraud statute to include the defendant's act of giv-
ing fraudulent insurance claims to superior for mailing to defendant's home office,
thereby making superior defendant's agent).
41. See Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1954) (explaining that when
someone does an act with knowledge that the use of the mails will follow in the ordinary
course of business, or when such use can be reasonably foreseen, even though not actu-
ally intended, then the person causes the mails to be used); see also United States v.
Smith, 934 F.2d 270, 271-73 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding insufficient proof that use of the
mails was foreseeable); United States v. Wormick, 709 F.2d 454, 461 (7th Cir. 1983) (not-
ing that once a defendant "becomes a party to the scheme, he can be held accountable
for mailings caused by other members, whether or not he knew of or agreed to any spe-
cific mailing"); see generally James Bucci, Recent Decision, 63 TEmp. L. REv. 893 (1990)
(discussing the reasonable foreseeability standard in light of United States v. Bortnov-
sky, 879 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1989)).
42. See United States v. Clark, 121 F. 190 (M.D. Pa. 1903). In Clark the court
stated:
What is sought to be prevented is an abuse of the post office facilities of the
country to carry out schemes to defraud, a far wider range being secured
through this public agency, with greater chance for immunity on account of the
distance at which they are able to be undertaken. But, as stated above, this use
must be an essential of the scheme, and not a mere adjunct or incident. The
original design of the parties must contemplate and embrace it. So the statute
reads, and we cannot enlarge upon it.
Id. at 191.
43. See Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 394 (1916). In the more recent case
of United States v. Serino, 835 F.2d 924 (1st Cir. 1987), the court stated, "It is not neces-
sary, however, that each mailing guarantee the success of the scheme, or even signifi-
cantly advance it." Id. at 928.
44. See United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 399-402 (1974). In United States v.
Fermin Castillo, 829 F.2d 1194 (1st Cir. 1987), the court stated: "The communications
must also have been more than peripheric; they must have touched one or more of the
[Vol. 43
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Today, in light of the recent case of Schmuck v. United States,"
the relationship has been transformed to a subjective examination of
"whether the mailing is part of the execution of the scheme as con-
ceived by the perpetrator at the time.'" This evolution significantly
expands the scope of conduct that can fall prey to a mail fraud charge.
C. Mail Fraud As It Relates to Wire Fraud and RICO
A significant addition to the fraud section of title 18 is evidenced
by the inclusion of a wire fraud provision.4 " This section operates in
pari passu to the mail fraud provision.4 s Like the present mail fraud
provision, wire fraud's elements emphasize the scheme to defraud, as
opposed to the means used to effectuate the deception.49 Here again,
although use of the wires is required, its role in the offense is merely
perfunctory because the crux of the offense is the fraudulent conduct.50
A noteworthy feature of both mail and wire fraud is the fact that
these offenses can serve as predicate offenses for a charge pursuant to
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO).5 1 This
Act, a provision of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,12 has
been the subject of significant controversy. 53 The extensiveness of
RICO is demonstrated by the use of mail fraud charges as predicates of
core transactions of the plot. The needed degree of integration defies formulaic quantifi-
cation. Each case must be judged on its own facts to ascertain whether the predicate
message was 'closely related to the scheme.'" Id. at 1199.
45. 489 U.S. 705 (1989).
46. Id. at 715.
47. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (West Supp. 1991).
48. See Fermin Castillo, 829 F.2d at 1198. The wire fraud statute parallels and was
patterned after the mail fraud statute. See id. Because the elements of the scheme to
defraud are identical under both statutes, courts have used mail fraud cases for guidance
in construing cases under the wire fraud statute. E.g., United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d
1327, 1334 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226 (1984); United States v. Feld-
man, 711 F.2d 758, 763 n.1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 939 (1983).
49. See 9 JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 38, § 9-44.210.
50. See United States v. Mercer, 133 F. Supp. 288, 289 (N.D. Cal. 1955) (holding
that a complaint must allege the particulars of the scheme to defraud).
51. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 (West 1984 & Supp. 1991). RICO prohibits the receipt of
income from a pattern of racketeering. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988). A pattern of racke-
teering requires two acts of racketeering within the statutory time limits. Id. § 1961(5).
Activity that is indictable under the mail fraud and wire fraud statutes can qualify as
racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1)(A) (West Supp. 1991).
52. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (current-version at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-
1968 (West 1984 & Supp. 1991)).
53. See generally William J. Hughes, RICO Reform: How Much Is Needed?, 43
VAND. L. REv. 639 (1990) (stating that controversies over the large number of predicate
offenses and the vague definitions of the statute raise the question whether the RICO
statute could sustain a constitutional attack).
1992]
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the offense.54 A pattern of mailed letters can result in a sentence en-
hancement of up to twenty years.
5
III. SCHEME TO DEFRAUD
A key controversy of, recent vintage involves whether the term
"scheme to defraud" permits frauds aimed at a deprivation of intangi-
ble rights, or includes only frauds involving money or property."' The
intangible rights doctrine can be examined on three levels: initial legis-
lative action, judicial interpretation, and legislative reaction to this ju-
dicial interpretation.
A. Intangible Rights Doctrine
In 1909 Congress amended the mail fraud statute by adding the
words "or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudu-
lent pretenses. '57 There was inconsiderable legislative guidance offered
at the time of its passage.58 This amendment codified the holding of
Durland v. United States,50 a case that liberated the statutory con-
straints of mail fraud by permitting actions premised upon future acts
to defraud.60
From this legislative base judicial interpretation developed in the
1940s81 and evolved into full bloom in the 1970s 2 and 1980s,11 that
54. See United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that mail-
ing fraudulent tax returns is a predicate offense under RICO because such mailing is
indictable under the mail fraud statute).
55. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963 (West Supp. 1991). The sentence also can include a fine and
forfeiture of the property acquired or maintained from the illegality. Id.
56. Id. § 1341.
57. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 215, 35 Stat. 1088, 1130 (current version at 18
U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West Supp. 1991)).
58. "The sponsor of the 1909 legislation did not address the significance of the new
language, stating that it was self-explanatory." McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350,
358 n.7 (1987) (citing 42 CONG. REC. 1026 (1908) (remarks of Sen. Heyburn)).
59. 161 U.S. 306 (1896).
60. Id. at 313.
61. See Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir.) (holding that any scheme
by corruption of a public official is a fraud), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941), overruled
on other grounds by United States v. Cruz, 478 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
910 (1973); United States v. Classic, 35 F. Supp. 457 (E.D. La. 1940) (applying intangible
rights theory to election commissioner's scheme to defraud).
62. See United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.) (applying intangible rights
theory to bribery of state officials), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974); United States v.
States, 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973) (applying intangible rights doctrine to fraud by can-
didates for city office), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974).
63. See United States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 304 (7th Cir.) (applying intangible rights
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being, the intangible rights theory." Prosecutors indicted and con-
victed public officials pursuant to the intangible rights doctrine with a
finding that they had deprived the citizenry of the right to good
government.6 5
The progression of this doctrine came to a screeching halt in 1987
when the United States Supreme Court voided the use of intangible
rights in the case of McNally v. United States.6 6 In a mere stroke of
the pen, five justices found that "the original impetus behind the mail
fraud statute was to protect the people from schemes tb deprive them
of their money or property.
'67
The jury in McNally had not been charged to find any defrauding
of money or property in reaching their mail fraud conviction. 5 As
such, the conviction, predicated upon evidence of an insurance scheme
that operated to deprive citizens of their intangible rights to good gov-
ernment, required reversal. 9
theory to fraud by county judge), vacated, 484 U.S. 807 (mem.), rev'd, 840 F.2d 1343 (7th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1035 (1988); United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108
(2d Cir. 1982) (applying the intangible rights theory to a kickback scheme run by a local
political leader), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983).
64. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., From Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the
Criminalization of Fiduciary Breaches and the Problematic Line Between Law and
Ethics, 19 Am. CRiM. L. Rav. 117 (1981) (criticizing the intangible rights theory in mail
fraud cases); W. Robert Gray, Comment, The Intangible-Rights Doctrine and Political-
Corruption Prosecutions Under the Federal Mail Fraud Statute, 47 U. CH. L. REv. 562
(1980) (arguing against use of the intangible rights doctrine in political corruption cases).
65. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 362 n.1 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(listing cases in which courts have convicted public officials of "defrauding citizens of
their right to the honest services of their governmental officials").
66. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
67. Id. at 356. See generally Paul W. Barnett, Note, McNally v. United States:
Mail Fraud-The Procrustean Bed Couldn't Stretch This One, 48 LA. L. Rav. 723 (1988)
(interpreting McNally to exclude from the scope of the mail fraud statute a fiduciary
violation without a transfer of something with economic value); Ellen Berkowitz, Note,
The Rise and Fall of the Right to Honest Government: Prosecuting Public Corruption
After McNally v. United States, 22 Loy. LA. L. REv. 325 (1988) (examining development
of intangible rights doctrine and the effect of McNally); Donna M. Ducey, Note, Mc-
Nally v. United States: The Demise of the Intangible Rights Doctrine, 66 N.C. L. REv.
1035 (1988) (arguing that the Court removed an important protection of the rights of the
public).
68. McNally, 483 U.S. at 354-55.
69. See id. at 360. The governor of Kentucky gave Howard P. "Sonny" Hunt, Ken-
tucky Democratic Party Chairman, de facto control to choose the insurance companies
from which the State of Kentucky would purchase its policies. Hunt agreed with the
Wombwell Insurance Company of Lexington, Kentucky (Wombwell), which had previ-
ously acted as the State's agent in selecting a workmen's compensation policy, that
Wombwell would continue to act as the State's agent and would share with other insur-
ance agencies designated by Hunt any commissions paid to Wombwell in excess of
$50,000. Defendants Gray, a former public official of Kentucky, and McNally, a private
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In a strong dissent Justice Stevens, joined by Justice O'Connor in
three of four parts, severely criticized the majority opinion's reading of
the statute's phrasing in the conjunctive.70 The two justices argued to
uphold the multitude of existing precedent that interpreted the statute
in the disjunctive, reading merit into the "or" separating "scheme or
artifice to defraud" from "money or property. 7 1 They argued that gov-
ernment attorneys should have the option of proceeding under any one
of the following three "separate prohibitions" established by the stat-
ute: "'[1] any scheme or artifice to defraud, [2] or for obtaining money
or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, . . . [3] or
[counterfeiting].' ,,72
The aftermath of McNally created serious questions on issues
such as retroactivity and use of the writ of coram nobis.7 Confusion
existed on whether to construe McNally to affect only cases that omit-
ted charges to the jury of "money or property" or to encompass all
cases that had proceeded under an intangible rights doctrine.7 4
The precedential effect of McNally was further quagmired when
the United States Supreme Court, within five months of the McNally
individual, received payments through this insurance scheme. Id. at 352-53. The Govern-
ment's principal theory was "that petitioners' participation in a self-dealing patronage
scheme defrauded the citizens and government of Kentucky of certain 'intangible rights,'
such as the right to have the Commonwealth's affairs conducted honestly." Id. at 352.
70. Justice Stevens wrote:
Yet, today, the Court, for all practical purposes, rejects this longstanding con-
struction of the statute by imposing a requirement that a scheme or artifice to
defraud does not violate the statute unless its purpose is to defraud someone of
money or property. I am at a loss to understand the source or justification for
this holding. Certainly no canon of statutory construction requires us to ignore
the plain language of the provision.
Id. at 365 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 364-65.
72. Id. (emphasis and brackets supplied by court) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1341
(1982)).
73. See generally Craig M. Bradley, Foreword: Mail Fraud After McNally and
Carpenter. The Essence of Fraud, 79 J. Clns. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 573 (1988) (demonstrat-
ing that many cases should survive collateral -attack after McNally by showing unjust
enrichment of the defendant and an identifiable victim); Peter M. Oxman, Note, The
Federal Mail Fraud Statute After McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987): The
Remains of the Intangible Rights Doctrine and Its Proposed Congressional Restoration,
25 AM. CraM. L. REv. 743 (1988) (noting, for example, that post-McNally collateral at-
tacks threaten as many as 185 convictions under the mail fraud statute); Deborah
Sprenger, Annotation, Effect upon Prior Convictions of McNally v. United States Rule
that Mail Fraud Statute (18 USCS § 1341) Is Directed Solely at Deprivation of Prop-
erty Rights, 97 A.L.R. FED. 797 (1990) (showing that courts have arrived at different
determinations of the retroactive effect of McNally in the face of challenges to mail
fraud convictions based on the intangible rights doctrine).
74. See sources cited supra note 73.
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decision, took the opportunity to rethink its position by accepting for
review the case of Carpenter v. United States.7 5 In Carpenter the
Court upheld convictions for mail and wire fraud that were based upon
the misuse of confidential information. Winans, a columnist for the
Wall Street Journal, disclosed material from his highly regarded col-
umn to coconspirators who used the advance information to buy and
sell stocks based upon the probable impact of the articles on the mar-
ket. Profits were shared among the parties. The United States Su-
preme Court found that this use of the material violated an employee's
fiduciary obligation to protect confidential information of the employer
secured during employment.7 6 The Court found the information to be
property, albeit intangible in nature, but sufficient to meet the prop-
erty element within the mail and wire fraud statutes.
7
7
Carpenter, therefore, serves to reinforce McNally's holding, which
required "money or property," but also extends its realm to include
both tangible and intangible property. The Carpenter Court's clarifica-
tion also forecloses post-McNally writs whenever intangible property,
as opposed to intangible rights to honest and impartial government, is
portrayed in the charging instrument.
78
The legislative reaction to the judiciary's interpretations is seen in
Congress's acceptance of a challenge by the McNally Court to clarify
mail fraud's boundaries.7 9 The severe and acerbic criticism80 leveled
upon the United States Supreme Court's ruling was quickly endorsed
by Congress.
The new appendage to mail fraud, section 1346 of title 18, was
passed as a segment of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.81 Although it
75. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
76. Id. at 28. The Carpenter case has considerable implications in the corporate
setting. See generally Peter R. Ezersky, Note, Intra-Corporate Mail and Wire Fraud:
Criminal Liability for Fiduciary Breach, 94 YALE L.J. 1427 (1985) (discussing the effect
of mail and wire fraud on fiduciary breachs prior to Carpenter).
77. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 25. The use of information as property also has consid-
erable impact in the law of intellectual property. See Pamela Samuelson, Information as
-Property: Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal a Changing Direction in Intellectual
Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365 (1989).
78. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Hush!: The Criminal Status of Confidential Informa-
tion After McNally and Carpenter and the Enduring Problem of Overcriminalization,
26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 121, 143 (1988).
79. In McNally the Court stated, "If Congress desires to go further, it must speak
more clearly than it has." 483 U.S. at 360.
80. See generally Thomas Brom, Expanded Mail Fraud a Dead Letter, 7 CAL.
LAW. 11 (Oct. 1987) (quoting several statements opposing the result and effect in Mc-
Nally); Kaplan, supra note 26; Jeffrey J. Dean & Doye E. Green, Jr., Note, McNally v.
United States and Its Effect on the Federal Mail Fraud Statute: Will White Collar
Criminals Get a Break?, 39 MERCER L. REv. 697 (1988).
81. Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603(a), 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A.
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bears no resemblance to its surrounding provisions, it is clear that its
inclusion within the Drug Act was to facilitate its passage in Congress.
The section expands the term "scheme or artifice to defraud" to in-
clude a deprivation of the "intangible right of honest services."82
B. 1346 Ramifications
Section 1346 of title 18 appears to restore mail fraud to its status
prior to the McNally decision. Clearly the drafters of the one sentence
intended that effect.8 3 In meeting the public's cry for curtailing govern-
ment corruption, however, Congress has enacted legislation that may
prove to be ambiguous, vague, and a source of political retribution .
8
Section 1346 defines "scheme to defraud" to include the intangible
right of honest services. The statute does not, however, define the term
"honest services." Absent this definition, when interpreting the statute
one can turn to the legislative history. In the legislative history we find
that Representative Conyers stated that the purpose of this provision
was to restore mail fraud to its pre-McNally status.85 It is evident that
there are a plethora of pre-McNally cases that employ the intangible
rights doctrine. 8 Quantity, however, should not be mistaken for
propriety.
Defendants have unsuccessfully argued on appeal the issue of
§ 1346 (West Supp. 1991)).
82. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1346 (West Supp. 1991). Section 1346 states, "For the purposes
of this chapter, the term 'scheme or artifice to defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to
deprive another of the intangible right of honest services." Id.
83. Representative Conyers stated, "This amendment restores the mail fraud pro-
vision to where that provision was before the McNally decision." See 134 CONG. REc.
H11,251 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Rep. Conyers).
84. Terrance Reed appeared on behalf of the National Association of Criminal De-
fense Lawyers before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice during the period that the
committee considered an expansion of mail fraud to include intangible rights. Mr. Reed
stated:
The proposed modifications would encompass any lie, any misrepresentation,
any breach of a promise, or any dashed expectations. It could apply to every
Member of Congress who has ever misrepresented his motives in supporting a
piece of legislation-by proclaiming an altruistic public purpose, while
hiding his real goal of humoring his party's leadership, or of promoting his own
reelection. The term "intangible rights" is not defined. It has no limit
"whatsoever."
Mail Fraud, 1987: Hearings on H.R. 3089 and H.R. 3050, Fraud Amendment Acts of
1987, Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. of the Judiciary,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 106 (1988).
85. 134 CONG. REc. H11,251 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Rep. Conyers).
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vagueness when convicted of mail fraud under an intangible rights the-
ory.s" Despite strict construction of this penal statute against the Gov-
ernment, s the courts generally have found that there has been both
fair warning and an insufficient showing that the statute fails to guard
against arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.89 Mail fraud does
not rise to the level of vagueness found in a statute that gives police
unlimited discretion. 0 On its face, the courts have found that the lan-
guage of the statute is not a standardless sweep allowing police, prose-
cutors, or juries to pursue personal prejudices.9 1
These pre-McNally cases, however, were not always predicated on
the words "honest services," the terms presently used in the most re-
cent mail fraud addendum. Oftentimes terms such as "good govern-
ment,"92 breach of "duty of loyalty," 3 and "betrayal of the public
trust" 19 were the indicted conduct. As such, even the wealth of pre-
McNally cases employing the intangible rights doctrine need to be mit-
igated to include only those that provide actual correlation to the lan-
guage presently used in section 1346.
The United States Supreme Court has yet to squarely find the
term "honest services" in the context of the mail fraud statute to be
acceptable. The extension of mail fraud into the realm of intangible
rights has in fact been the subject of occasional judicial criticism95 and
constant scholarly censure.96 Judge Winter attacked the intangible
87. See United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 913 (1983); United States v. Bohonus, 628 F.2d 1167 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447
U.S. 928 (1980); United States v. Louderman, 576 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 896 (1978).
88. See Margiotta, 688 F.2d at 120.
89. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AuSTIN W. Scorr, Ja., CRIMINAL LAW 92 (2d
ed. 1986) (describing the test for determining whether a statute is void for vagueness).
90. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (finding California statute
that required loiterers to provide credible and reliable identification unconstitutional);
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974) (holding flag misuse statute void for vagueness);
see also Anthony G. Amsterdam, Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Su-
preme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960) (providing an excellent discussion of the void-
for-vagueness doctrine).
91. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 (quoting Smith, 415 U.S. at 575); Louderman, 576
F.2d at 1388.
92. Margiotta, 688 F.2d at 120.
93. See United States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920, 922 (2d .Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 915 (1982).
94. See United States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 304, 311 (7th Cir.), vacated, 484 U.S. 807
(mem.), rev'd, 840 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1035 (1988).
95. See Margiotta, 688 F.2d at 140 n.3 (Winter, J., dissenting) (listing cases in
which courts have expressed apprehension about the expansion of mail fraud into the
area of intangible rights).
96. Coffee, supra note 16; Daniel J. Hurson, Limiting the Federal Mail Fraud
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rights doctrine in his dissent to the majority opinion in United States
v. Margiotta,'7 noting that "there is no end to the common political
practices which may now be swept within the ambit of mail fraud."98
The effect of section 1346 is perhaps best exemplified by consider-
ing an absurd application." President George Bush, in running for the
Office of President, was hailed as a man who would not increase taxes.
His famous words in the Bush-Dukakis debate were: "'Read my lips:
No new taxes.'-lo The public heard this promise via television and
radio, thus, use of the wires. It also is likely that these words appeared
in the campaign literature sent to voters through the mail. One can
claim that Bush's election to the Office of President was predicated
upon voters' acceptance of this campaign promise. Yet, after the elec-
tion we see President Bush changing heart and saying that taxes may
have to increase. 101
Can it be claimed that Bush operated a scheme to defraud the
public by securing votes on a promise of no new taxes? Clearly, it was
his intent to secure voters through this campaign promise. Can it fur-
ther be claimed that he was not honest with the public? If George
Bush authorizes a legislative increase in taxes, will he be acting dishon-
estly and depriving the public of his "honest services?"
One, maybe, can claim that Bush did not intend to be dishonest in
that he could not foresee the economic problems of the future. But this
issue of intent would be for a jury to decide, and a zealous prosecutor
might argue that Bush should have "foreseen" this possibility. A lead-
ing economist claimed that George Bush "was spouting nonsense.110 2
But does that nonsense reach the level of dishonesty and criminality
under the mail fraud statute?
Obviously, the Justice Department will not charge George Bush
with mail fraud.103 But the very fact that his conduct meets the statu-
Statute-A Legislative Approach, 20 Am. CRrm. L. REV. 423 (1983); Williams, supra note
31.
97. 688 F.2d 108, 139-44 (2d Cir. 1982) (Winter, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 913 (1983).
98. Id. at 140.
99. The author believes that prosecutorial discretion would cause even the Justice
Department not to file this one.
100. Andrew Rosenthal, Bush Now Concedes a Need for "Tax Revenue Increases"
to Reduce Deficit in Budget, N.Y. TMES, June 27, 1990, at Al, col. 6.
101. Id.
102. Walter D. Fackler, Speech at 30th Annual Business Forecast Luncheon (Dec.
12, 1990) (available as Special Selected Paper, University of Chicago Graduate School of
Business). Professor Fackler stated: "In addition to his promise not to increase taxes,
President Bush told'us that we would outgrow the deficit. I warned in my last two ap-
pearances at this podium that he was spouting nonsense." Id. at 7.
103. In addition to the absurdity of this application, a procedural impediment is
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tory definition exhibits the possibly limitless bounds of the mail fraud
statute. The prosecutor that decides not to proceed in this scenario has
the equivalent power to use the threat of criminal indictment in in-
stances that have political implications.1° Clearly, the open-ended gun
provided to the executive branch exceeds federalism standards 0 5 and
promotes haphazard application.
The United States Supreme Court should not be satisfied with the
legislative response to McNally in adding section 1346 to the mail
fraud statute, a definitional section that permits a mail fraud scheme
to be premised upon the intangible right to honest services. Further
clarification is required by the legislature. Congress must enumerate
the specific types of conduct that constitute dishonesty and the scope
of when a political malfeasance will become criminal. Absent legislative
restructuring, 06 it is necessary for our courts to provide judicial inter-
pretation to the newly added definitional section of mail fraud. That
interpretation should include a message to the government representa-
tives that further legislative reaction is necessary.
IV. IN FURTHERANCE
Time has served to enlarge the scope of the crime of mail fraud by
prevalent. The Bush-Dukakis debates preceded the passage of § 1346 and therefore
would have precluded an indictment premised upon intangible rights. See United States
v. Schwartz, 924 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1991) (prohibiting retroactive application of § 1346 to
pre-McNally intangible rights conduct); McEvoy Travel Bureau, Inc. v. Heritage Travel,
Inc., 904 F.2d 786 (lst Cir.) (finding in a civil action that § 1346 cannot be applied retro-
actively), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 536 (1990). But see United States v. Johns, 742 F.
Supp. 196 (E.D: Pa. 1990) (finding no ex post facto prohibition to pre-McNally conduct
premised on intangible rights), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 941 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir.
1991).
104. For example, a violation of a disciplinary rule by an attorney may support a
mail fraud claim against that attorney, should the prosecutor choose to pursue it:
If the local leader of a political party, who is not a public officeholder, can be
convicted of mail fraud for depriving citizens of their right to honest govern-
ment, no major conceptual leap is required to argue that a lawyer who deprives
the pubic of its right to the honest administration of justice should also be held
liable.
Ellsworth A. Van Graafeiland, The Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct and
the Mail Fraud Statute, 48 BROoK L. REv. 653, 659 (1982) (footnote omitted).
105. See Ralph E. Loomis, Comment, Federal Prosecution of Elected State Officials
for Mail Fraud: Creative Prosecution or an Affront to Federalism?, 28 AM. U. L. REv. 63
(1978); see also Andrew T. Baxter, Federal Discretion in the Prosecution of Local Politi-
cal Corruption, 10 PEPP. L. Rav. 321, 336-43 (1983) (discussing federalism concerns as
they relate to four federal statutes, including mail fraud, in the prosecution of local
corruption).
106. For a discussion of the need for legislative restructuring to the mail fraud stat-
ute, see infra notes 322-37 and accompanying text.
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permitting an increasingly more expansive definition to what will con-
stitute being "a part of the execution" of a scheme to defraud.10 7 Limi-
tations that provided defense counsel with arguments to curtail
prosecutorial selectivity of charges have, for the most part, been ren-
dered worthless.
A. Conduct
It is difficult to provide a semblance of structure to the concepts
elicited from the cases involving the "in furtherance" aspect of the
crime of mail fraud. A haphazard approach is apparent, with the
United States Supreme Court and lower courts picking and choosing
favorable phraseology from precedent without necessarily taking the
perspective of the cases immediately preceding the pending matter.108
Although several rules of law exist that indicate what will or will not
satisfy the "in furtherance" element, a discussion of these concepts
may appear circular, redundant, and oftentimes lacking order. In this
morass, however, it is without doubt that the statute requires some
relationship between the mailing and the scheme to defraud.
Several premises have evolved that emphasize the breadth of per-
missible conduct that will serve to meet the requirement of a mailing
that is in furtherance of a scheme to defraud. "Innocent" mailings, as
well as mailings between innocent parties, will provide sufficient evi-
dence of this element.10 9 Further, it is not necessary that the mailing
be an essential element of the scheme. Mere incidence to the scheme'1 0
or one "step in a plot""' is acceptable. Even routine mailings can now
suffice.
112
107. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West Supp. 1991); see Lynn, supra note 30, at 941 (stating
that the requirement is broadly interpreted and applied).
108. The Court in Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954), ignored a doctrine set
forth in the prior case of Kann v. United States, 323 U.S. 88 (1944). In Schmuck v.
United States, 489 U.S. 705 (1989), the court failed to mention the rules in United States
v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75 (1962), and United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438 (1986). For
cases of lower courts after the case of Schmuck, see infra notes 265-87 and accompany-
ing text.
109. See United States v. Draiman, 784 F.2d 248, 251 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that
mailings from attorney for defrauded insurance company to persons other than the de-
fendant were sufficient).
110. See Pereira, 347 U.S. at 8 (holding that once a scheme is established, it is suffi-
cient if the mailing is incident to an essential part of the scheme).
111. See Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 394 (1916). According to Justice
Holmes, the author of the Badders opinion, subjectivity can be examined. He noted,
"Intent may make an otherwise innocent act criminal." Id.
112. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (holding that a routine
mailing of the Wall Street Journal was sufficient). In United States v. Tarnopol, 561
F.2d 466, 472 (3d Cir. 1977), the Third Circuit had found, however, that innocent mail-
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United States v. Clark113 marks the initial subjective test that re-
quired the defendant to contemplate the mailing as an essential aspect
of the scheme.11" The court found that a mailing which was merely
"adjunct or incident" to the scheme was insufficient to form the neces-
sary causal connection between the mailing and the scheme to de-
fraud.11 5 In Clark the court quashed an indictment that had failed to
allege more than mere use of the mails. 6 The use, the court stated,
was "merely the overt act. ' ' "11 If the scheme could have been accom-
plished through canvassers, solicitors, or advertisements in public
print, one could not assume that use of the mails was contemplated by
the alleged offenders as an essential aspect of the offense. Lacking an
allegation or proof of the defendant's subjective intent of essentiality
in using the mails to accomplish this fraudulent scheme, the statutory
elements were not met. 18
Subsequent case law moved away from this subjective test to a
standard of whether the mailing was a step in the execution of the
fraudulent scheme9 or "a step in a plot.1 2° The courts shifted from
the requirement that the mailing be an essential part of the scheme to
an analysis of whether it was "incident to an essential part of the
scheme."' 2 The subjective test, which required contemplation by the
defendant of the causal connection between the fraudulent scheme and
mailing, appeared to be eliminated by United States v. Young.1 22
ings were insufficient to support a mail fraud conviction. The court analogized innocent
mailings to mailings required by law, which the Court in Parr v. United States, 363 U.S.
370 (1960), found were not sufficient to satisfy the in furtherance requirement. In the
Carpenter district court opinion the court distinguished Tarnopol, claiming not only
that Tarnopol dealt with routine mailings, but also that the mailings in Tarnopol were
unrelated to the fraudulent scheme. United States v. Winans, 612 F. Supp. 827, 846
(S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub noma. United States v. Carpenter, 791
F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
113. 121 F. 190 (M.D. Pa. 1903).
114. Id. at 191.
115. Id. Courts have been notoriously lenient on the admission of evidence to meet
the mail fraud statute. As long as the evidence relates to an allegation in the indictment,
it is admissible. See Stokes v. United States, 157 U.S. 187, 193 (1895).
116. Clark, 121 F. at 191.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See United States v. Kenofskey, 243 U.S. 440, 443 (1917) (finding mail fraud
charge permissible because payment and receipt executed the scheme, but did not "serve
to 'trammel up the consequence' of the fraudulent use of the mails").
120. Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 394 (1916).
121. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954); see also United States v. Shep-
herd, 511 F.2d 119, 122 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that use of mails was incidental to essen-
tial element of defendant's check kiting scheme).
122. 232 U.S. 155 (1914).
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Young held that it is not necessary that the scheme contemplate the
use of the mails as an essential element."
12
The loss of intensity of the relationship between the mailing and
scheme is highlighted in more recent decisions, which reveal that
courts continue to look objectively for some causality, but stop upon
finding a mere tangential relationship between the scheme and the
mailing.12 Some courts employ a test of whether the mailing was "suf-
ficiently closely related to fthe] scheme to bring [the] conduct within
the statute.'" 2 A mailing prior to contemplation of the scheme appears
to be per se sufficient.
2
B. Limitations
For a number of years several limitations upon the "in further-
ance" aspect of mail fraud furnished defense arguments for winning
dismissals and reversals in mail fraud cases.127 The limitations upon
the "in furtherance" aspect of the crime of mail fraud arise from four,
basically unrelated, avenues.
The first instance is when the mailing clearly conflicts with, rather
than promotes, the scheme.128 Second, courts have refused use of the
mail fraud statute where the mailing is an imperative duty imposed by
the state.22 Third, when the mailing occurs prior to the commence-
ment of the scheme, mail fraud is not applicable. 30 Finally, and most
noteworthy, are cases in which the scheme reaches fruition prior to the
mailing. 13' An exception to several of these limitations, however, is
when the purpose of the mailing serves to lull one into the scheme to
defragd. 132 Thus, mailings that conflict with the scheme or are after
123, See id. at 161-62.
124, See Pereira, 347 U.S. at 8; see also United States v. Buchanan, 544 F.2d 1322,
1325 (5th Cir.) (holding that mails need not be essential, only incident to the essential
part: the statute does not require a but-for relationship), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907
(1977).
125. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 399 (1974).
126. See United States v. Silvano, 812 F.2d 754, 760 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v.
McNeili, 728 F.2d 5, 14-15 (1st Cir. 1984).
127. For a discussion of these limitations, see infra notes 133-229 and accompanying
text.
128. For a discussion of mailings that conflict with the scheme, see infra notes 133-
47 and accompanying text.
129. For a discussion of mailings under imperative duty, see infra notes 148-63 and
accompanying text.
130. For a discussion of mailings prior to the commencement of the scheme, see
infra notes 164-72 and accompanying text.131. For a discussion of mailings after the scheme has reached fruition, see infra
notes 173-211 and accompanying text.
132. For a discussion of the "lulling" exception, see infra notes 212-29 and accompa-
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completion of the fraudulent scheme and serve as lulling devices for
enticing the innocent into the scheme will be mailings in furtherance of
the scheme to defraud.
1. Conflicts with Scheme to Defraud
Mailings that aid in the detection of fraud or conflict with the ulti-
mate purpose of the scheme are diametrically opposed to the defend-
ant acting with an evil mens rea in a fraudulent scheme. Therefore,
they are not in furtherance of the scheme to defraud.
This doctrine is evident in the frequently cited case of United
States v. Maze.' In Maze the defendant's conviction for mail fraud
was reversed because the mailings were not sufficiently closely related
to defendant's scheme to bring his conduct within the statute.1 3 4 The
defendant allegedly stole his roommate's credit card and used the card
to charge food and lodging while traveling to various states. 135 The de-
fendant's roommate timely reported the theft of his credit card to the
issuing bank. The indictment, which charged the defendant with four
counts of mail fraud, based the alleged fraudulent conduct upon four
of the stolen credit card presentations to restaurants and lodges. The
Government contended that the merchant's act of mailing the sales
slips to the issuing bank constituted a mailing in furtherance of the
scheme to defraud. 13 6 The victim of the alleged crime was the issuing
bank of the credit card.
3 7
The major premise upon which the Supreme Court affirmed the
circuit court's reversal of the defendant's conviction was the fact that
the mailing occurred after fruition of the scheme to defraud. 13 How-
ever, a subsidiary point mentioned by the Sixth Circuit 139 and noted by
the United States Supreme Court was the counterproductivity of the
mailing to the essence of the scheme."4° The mailing of the credit card
slips was in conflict with defendant's purpose. "Indeed, from his point
of view, he probably would have preferred to have the invoices mis-
nying text.
133. 414 U.S. 395 (1974).
134. Id. at 399.
135. Id. at 396.
136. Id. at 396-97.
137. Id. at 396.
138. For a discussion of the Maze decision being premised on the mailing occurring
after fruition of the scheme to defraud, see infra notes 200-09 and accompanying text.
139. United States v. Maze, 468 F.2d 529, 534-35 (6th Cir. 1972), aff'd, 414 U.S. 395
(1974).
140. Maze, 414 U.S. at 402.
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placed by the various motel personnel and never mailed at all."""
The inapplicability of the crime of mail fraud to mailings that con-
flict with the scheme to defraud also is noted in several circuit court
decisions.142 For example, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
a mail fraud conviction in which the mailings emanated from a scheme
to defraud an insurance company by an alleged arson of a restaurant to
obtain the proceeds of a fire insurance policy. 143 The court found that
the mailings tended to produce evidence of the defendant's involve-
ment and therefore conflicted with the defendant's purpose and were
not in furtherance of the scheme.1
4 4
The First Circuit likewise reversed a wire fraud conviction in
which telexes forming the object of the wire fraud conflicted with,
rather than promoted, the defendant's scheme." 5 Absent a showing
that the telexes, which were sent between banks to verify a certificate
of deposit given a customer as security for a debt, had lulled the cus-
tomer into believing that defendant's debt to the customer was se-
cured, the telexes could not be the basis for a wire fraud conviction.
146
Like the accused in the Maze case, the defendant in the First Circuit
case "probably would have preferred that the telexes not be sent at all
since the ultimate result was the detection of his scheme.
1 47
In determining whether a mailing is counterproductive to the
scheme or promotes the scheme to defraud, several avenues of ap-
proach are evident. First, one can examine the mailing to determine
whether the document is at variance with the defendant's scheme. Sec-
ond, one can examine whether the letter or wire serves to conceal or
promote detection of the defendant's involvement in the scheme to de-
fraud. That which promotes detection is contrary to the document be-
ing in execution of the scheme to defraud. Finally, one can examine
whether the mailing would have served the intent of the defendant in
accomplishing the scheme.
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., United States v. Castile, 795 F.2d 1273, 1278 (6th Cir. 1986); cf.
United States v. Pietri Giraldi, 864 F.2d 222, 225 (1st Cir. 1988) (wire fraud case). How-
ever, expressing doubt about the validity of the claims in a mailing will not be enough to,
find that the mailing conflicts with the scheme. See United States v. Serino, 835 F.2d
924, 928-29 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. LaFerriere, 546 F.2d 182, 187 (5th Cir. 1977).
143. United States v. Castile, 795 F.2d 1273 (6th Cir. 1986).
144. Id. at 1279. The Sixth Circuit in Castile used the "sufficiently closely related"
test of Maze, but found that a mailing cannot meet this test if it "conflicts with, rather
than promotes, the scheme to defraud." Id. at 1278.
1,15. Pietri Giraldi, 864 F.2d at 224-25.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 225. The First Circuit found, however, that a mailing which was designed
to cover up a fraud was in furtherance of the scheme. See United States v. Forzese, 756
F.2d 217, 220 (1st Cir. 1985).
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These first two examinations entail an objective review of the
mailing itself, while the last includes a reflection upon the subjective
intent of the defendant. The courts do not differentiate, however, be-
tween these two types of standards. Rather, they render a decision
upon one or more of the aforestated rationales with comments that im-
ply a combination of both objective and subjective review.
2. Imperative Duty Imposed by State
Mailings that result from an imperative duty to the state are not
in furtherance of a scheme to defraud. Parr v. United States148 is the
seminal United States Supreme Court case that describes this "legal
duty" exception to a mail fraud charge. Parr involved a twenty-count
indictment for mail fraud and conspiracy to commit mail fraud 149
stemming from the defendant's scheme to defraud a school district of
money through misappropriation and embezzlement. 50 The Court
found evidence supporting a "brazen scheme to defraud."' 5' The
scheme included mailings, namely statutorily mandated letters and en-
closures pertaining to the assessment and collection of school taxes.152
Lacking, however, was the element that the mailings be in furtherance
of the scheme to defraud. The Court stated:
[W]e think it cannot be said that mailings made or caused to be made
under the imperative command of duty imposed by state law are
criminal under the federal mail fraud statute, even though some of
those who are so required to do the mailing for the District plan to
steal . 153
Although Parr establishes the legal duty limitation to the "in further-
ance" element, the decision is repeatedly cited for its second holding
that the "in furtherance" element of the crime is not met when the
mailing occurs after the scheme has reached fruition.'5
148. 363 U.S. 370 (1960).
149. 18 U.S.C. § 371 is the statutory provision of conspiracy that the Court used in
Parr. Id. at 372.
150. Id. at 374-78.
151. Id. at 385.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 391. In United States v. Tarnopol, 561 F.2d 466, 472 (3d Cir. 1977), the
court used Parr to extend the legal duty prohibition to innocent mailings. The court
stated that mailings required by law are intrinsically innocent, and a distinction does not
exist between mailings required by law and other types of innocent mailings. Id. at 472.
Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987), limited Tarnopol by finding routine
mailings of the Wall Street Journal sufficient to proceed with a mail fraud charge. Id. at
28.
154. Parr, 363 U.S. at 393. Actually, only counts 17, 18, and 19 of the indictment
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Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justices Harlan and Stewart, wrote
a strong dissent in Parr. He contended that the lawfulness of the iso-'
lated act of mailing should not serve as immunity to a mail fraud
charge. 15 5 Although there has been no open adoption of Frankfurter's
dissent, subsequent cases often distinguish the Parr rule. 5 ' Often-
times, these distinctions are merely voiced by a statement that there
has been no showing that'the mailing was after fruition of the scheme
to defraud.
For example, when the victim of the fraud is the Internal Revenue
Service 57 or a state tax authority,' the filing of tax returns, legally
compelled documents, will not serve as a bar to a conviction for the
crime of mail fraud. A distinction perhaps can be made when the tax
returns are not required by statute, as in a case in which the defendant
is a scrivener of fictitious returns for the purpose of obtaining unde-
served tax refunds. 59 The cases are not limited, however, to schemes of
filing tax returns for refunds. 60 Regularly filed tax returns have served
as the mailing for a mail fraud charge.' These cases gloss over the
were found to be after the fruition of the scheme to defraud. Id. at 392-93. Yet, Parr is
often cited as having been reversed upon this rationale. See, e.g., Sclunuck v. United
States, 489 U.S. 705, 711 (1989); United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 464-65 (2d Cir.
1991). For a discussion of Parr's ruling on the mailing being after fruition of the scheme,
see infra notes 190-99 and accompanying text.
155. Parr, 363 U.S. at 396 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
156. In United States v. Brown, 583 F.2d 659, 667 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 909 (1979), the court found that a routine business mailing does not create a per se
exception to a charge of mail fraud. The test is whether the mailing is too remote from
the fraudulent scheme. When the mailing is too remote, the court will not view it as
being in furtherance of the scheme to defraud. Id. at 667-68.
157. See, e.g., United States v. Condo, 741 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam)
(holding that tax fraud and mail fraud are both permissible charges for submitting false
withholding forms), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1164 (1988); United States v. Miller, 545 F.2d
1204 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that mail fraud is justified when a defendant sends false
personal and corporate state and federal tax returns), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 930 (1977);
United States v. Brewer, 528 F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1975) (holding that mailings mandated
by a cigarette tax law are no defense to mail fraud charge).
158. See United States v. Mirabile, 503 F.2d 1065 (8th Cir. 1974) (understatement
of gross retail sales in monthly sales and use tax returns filed with the Missouri Depart-
ment of Revenue), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975); United States v. Flaxman, 495 F.2d
344 (7th Cir.) (false retailers' occupation tax returns submitted to the State of Illinois),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1031 (1974).
159. See United States v. Mangan, 575 F.2d 32 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 931
(1978). The Mangan court stated, "The scheme here was to swindle the Government by
causing it to pay out money to persons having no entitlement to it, in a fashion similar to
those embraced within the historic purpose of the mail fraud statute." Id. at 49 (citing
United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405-06 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
160. See generally Podgor, supra note 19, at 918-22.
161. See United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1987). Recently the
United States Department of Justice issued a guideline against the practice of using mail
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imperative duty limitation enunciated in Parr. In only one instance, a
case involving a mailed tax return sent after the object of the scheme
had been accomplished, did the court identify the Parr holding as the
basis for a reversal of the mail fraud counts.
162
Thus, the doctrine of legal duty as a limitation to a mail fraud
charge is best used when the mailing not only is a required document,
but also is dispatched after completion of the scheme to defraud.
163
Absent the latter premise, courts are reluctant to provide immunity to
a mail fraud charge.
3. Mailing Prior to Commencement of Scheme
In finding the necessary link between the mailing and the scheme
to defraud, courts have eliminated those mailings that occur before or
after fruition of the scheme. Thus, for many years only mailings occur-
ring simultaneously with the scheme itself supported a mail fraud
charge.
The first case to elaborate upon mailings being insufficient to sup-
port a mail fraud charge, if prior to commencement of the scheme to
defraud, was a district court opinion in 1954. United States v. Beall'
6 '
involved mailings that occurred as part of a fund raising campaign for
the Infantile Paralysis Foundation. A twenty-count indictment charged
the defendant with false statements, embezzlement, and mail fraud.1
65
Although the district court found the false statement charges permissi-
ble, it dismissed the mail fraud charges and held that they were not in
execution of the scheme to defraud."66 The court noted prior holdings
of insufficiency in those instances that the mailing was dispatched after
the fraudulent scheme. Although unable to provide any case authority
for the reverse scenario, the court noted that "[t]he use of the mails
before beginning to carry out a scheme to defraud is not a use for the
fraud for a fraudulently filed tax return. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES AT-
TORNEYS' MANUAL § 6-4.211(1) (1990) (stating that only in "exceptional circumstances"
will tax fraud be approved for prosecutions as mail fraud, and hence as a RICO
predicate).
162. United States v. Boyd, 606 F.2d 792, 794 (8th Cir. 1979) (holding that the mail
fraud statute cannot be involved with legally compelled mailings such as IRS income tax
payments).
163. Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705 (1989), suggests a new test for Parr's
applicability based upon whether the mailings would have been made despite the fraud-
ulent scheme's existence. If "but for" the scheme, the mailings would not have occurred,
then Parr's legal duty doctrine is irrelevant. Id. at 713 n.7.
164. 126 F. Supp. 363 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
165. Id. at 364. The embezzlement violated the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 13 (1988), and § 504 of the California Penal Code. BeaU, 126 F. Supp. at 364.
166. Beall, 126 F. Supp. at 366.
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purpose of executing the scheme, any more than is the use of the mails
after a scheme to defraud has been completed.'
1 67
The use of the mails in the Beall case was clearly for the lawful
purpose of raising money for the Infantile Paralysis Foundation. The
mailing was prior to any fraudulent conduct. The later misappropria-
tion of the money was therefore embezzlement of mail matter as op-
posed to mail fraud. 6 8 The court rejected the Government's argument
that the mail fraud statute applied because the defendant formed the
intent to embezzle the funds before the money was mailed. Intent, the
court stated, was immaterial.169
Clearly we see that the subjective intent of the defendant is irrele-
vant to whether there is a basis for proceeding with a mail fraud
charge. The Beall case sets a bright line test: if the mailing falls be-
tween the designated lines of before and after the fraud, mail fraud
charges are proper.
This rule of law enunciated in Beall was reiterated by the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Tarnopol.70 Here, the
court noted that the question to be asked and answered is whether the
mailings are "sufficiently closely related" to the fraudulent scheme'1
Although the question does not turn upon "'time or space,'" it does
eliminate mailings before the object of the scheme has begun and after
it has been accomplished.
7 2
4. Mailing After Fruition of Scheme
Three cases are noteworthy when discussing mailings that occur
after the fruition of the scheme to defraud. These cases, Kann v.
United States,17 3 Parr v. United States,174 and United States v.
Maze,17 5 all demonstrate the defenses that are available to a defendant
when the mailing occurs after the scheme has been accomplished. Each
of these cases, however, contains a strong dissent that shows a lack of
consensus within the United States Supreme Court. It is also notewor-
167. Id. at 365.
168. Id. at 365-66.
169. Id. at 366. The court also reasoned that "the mail fraud statute was not meant
to apply to persons who violate a position of trust and confidence by embezzling funds
that come into their hands directed to organizations lawfully entitled to receive these
funds through the mails." Id.
170. 561 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1977).
171. Id. at 471 (quoting United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 399 (1974)).
172. Id. at 472 (quoting United States v. LaFerriere, 546 F.2d 182, 187 (5th Cir.
1977)).
173. 323 U.S. 88 (1944).
174. 363 U.S. 370 (1960).
175. 414 U.S. 395 (1974).
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thy that, although the majority opinions reach consistent results in
these three decisions, other cases have carved out an exception to this
principle that can effectively emasculate its effect.1 7 6 This caveat in-
volves those instances in which the defendant uses the mailing to lull
the victim into the scheme.
The Court's initial adoption of excluding after-the-fact mailings
from being in furtherance of the scheme to defraud is represented in
Kann v. United States.7 7 Kann involved the use of a change under a
predecessor mail fraud statute. 7 8 Defendant Kann, president of a cor-
poration that manufactured munitions, was indicted along with fellow
workers 1' for allegedly diverting company funds from government con-
tracts for personal benefit.180 The scheme involved the use of a dummy
corporation for distributing profits to the defendants.' 8 ' The alleged
mailings were checks cashed by defendants that were subsequently
presented to the drawee banks for collection.1
8 2
The United States Supreme Court summarily ratified the jury's
findings of guilt on the issue of whether the scheme was fraudulent in
nature. 8 3 The Court likewise found sufficient inferences from the evi-
dence to support the finding that Kann "caused" the mailing of these
checks.' 8' The third issue concerned whether the mailing was in fur-
therance of the scheme. The Court concluded that the tangential rela-
tionship between the first two elements did not establish mail fraud
when the scheme was completed at the time of the mailing.
8 5
The majority of the Court rejected the Government's argument
that the scheme was continuing in nature and therefore the defend-
ant's expectation of future profits made the clearance of the checks
essential to the scheme.8 8 A strong four-person dissent, however, led
176. For discussion of the exception of mailings that lull the victims, see infra notes
212-29 and accompanying text.
177. 323 U.S. 88 (1944).
178. The current version is at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West Supp. 1991).
179. The codefendants were one officer and five salaried employees of Triumph Ex-
plosives, Inc. All except Kann pleaded nolo contendere to the charges. Kann was tried
and convicted on the second and third counts of the three-count indictment against the
seven defendants. Kann, 323 U.S. at 89.
180. Id. at 89-90.
181. Id. at 89-92.
182. Id. at 90-92.
183. Id. at 93.
184. Id. The Court imputed to the defendants the knowledge that a bank would
collect on these checks from the drawee bank through the mails. Id.
185. Id. at 94. The Court found as a matter of law that it was immaterial to the
defendants how the drawee banks collected on these checks. Id.
186. Id. at 95.
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by Justice Douglas,'18 7 endorsed this position. Highlighting the continu-
ing nature of the scheme, the dissent stated that "[tihe use of the
mails was crucial to the total success of the fraudulent project."'
8s
Applying the redrafted mail fraud statute, 189 the Supreme Court
reiterated the holding embodied in the Kann decision in the subse-
quent case of Parr v. United States.190 As previously noted, Parr in-
volved several counts of mailings compelled by legal duty that were
therefore inappropriate mailings to form charges for the crime of mail
fraud. 91 Three other counts upon which the defendants were con-
victed, which were not the subject of reversal on the basis of being
legally compelled mailings, also required reversal. The theory for ne-
gating the lower court's findings on these three counts was the adop-
tion of the petitioner's argument that the mailings were not in further-
ance of the scheme to defraud. 9 2 These latter mailings in Parr
involved collection and payment to an oil company from the school
district employing the defendants for defendants' fraudulent receipt of
gasoline and products. 93 As in Kann, the majority in Parr found that
the scheme had "reached fruition" in that it was immaterial to defend-
ant's scheme how the oil company would collect its payment from the
school district.1'9
Justice Frankfurter wrote an eloquent dissent in which Justices
Harlan and Stewart joined. 1 5 Although the mailings' relation to the
fraudulent scheme is a question of degree and proximity, Frankfurter
was quick to add that "[tihe adequate degree . . . is of course not a
matter susceptible of geometric determination."'96 Frankfurter as-
serted that the critical issue to be resolved was "whether the mailing
was designed materially to aid the consummation of the scheme."'197 He
asserted that the significance of the relationship is dependant upon
"the interconnection of the parts in a particular scheme."'9 8 Like the
Kann dissent, the dissent in Parr noted the necessity to examine the
scheme in its totality. Because the defendants intended to pad the
187. Id. at 95-96 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justices Black, Jackson, and Rutledge
concurred in Justice Douglas's dissent. Id.
188. Id. at 96.
189. The current version is at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West Supp. 1991).
190. 363 U.S. 370 (1960).
191. Id. at 389-91; see supra notes 148-63 and accompanying text (discussing Parr's
holding on mailings compelled by legal duty).
192. Parr, 363 U.S. at 393.
193. Id. at 392-93.
194. Id. at 393 (quoting Kann v. United States, 323 U.S. 88, 94 (1944)).
195. Id. at 394-404 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 397.
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bills, the payment of the bills was therefore within the scope of the
defendants' intent that the mailings be in furtherance of the scheme to
defraud. 19
United States v. Maze 00 was the final Supreme Court decision
which fortified the doctrine that mail fraud is inapplicable to schemes
which have reached fruition. As previously noted, Maze involved the
defendant's alleged use of a stolen credit card and the issuing bank's
attempt to collect on the bills created by such use.20' Using a new test
of proximity that focused on whether the mailings were "sufficiently
closely related" to the defendant's scheme to defraud,202 the Court re-
jected the Government's claim that these collection mailings were nec-
essary to the success of the scheme.
203
Here again, we see a strongly divided Supreme Court, with four
Justices dissenting in two separate written opinions.204 In the first dis-
sent, written by Chief Justice Burger, we see the oft-repeated line that
mail fraud is a "stopgap" device used to encompass new frauds that
develop.2 5 He emphasized the necessity to retain all possible strength
in the statute in order "to be able to cope with the new varieties of
fraud. 206 The second dissent 07 criticized the majority's belief that the
fraudulent scheme ends when a defendant uses the credit card as op-
posed to when the merchant collects on the card.2 1 Incorporating Jus-
tice Douglas's language from the dissent in Kann, Justice White stated
that the venture was continuing in nature and that because the issuing
bank was the actual victim of the fraud, the use of the mails was in
furtherance of the fraudulent scheme. 09
It is evident from these three cases that despite thirty years of
strong dissent, mailings after the scheme would be subject to close
199. Id. at 400.
200. 414 U.S. 395 (1974).
201. Id. at 396-97. For a discussion of the facts in Maze and how the Court found
that the mailing conflicted with the scheme, see supra notes 133-41 and accompanying
text.
202. Maze, 414 U.S. at 399.
203. Id. The Court rejected the Government's attempt to rely on United States v.
Sampson, 371 U.S. 75 (1962). The Court found that the mailings in Maze, unlike those in
Sampson, were not designed to lull the victims into a false sense of security. Maze, 414
U.S. at 403.
204. Maze, 414 U.S. at 405-16.
205. Id. at 405-06 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 407.
207. Id. at 408-16 (White, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan
and Blackmun joined in Justice White's dissent.
208. Id. at 410-14.
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scrutiny by courts. Those resembling "post-fraud accounting"21 0 would
not be tolerated. Likewise, an examination of the line between the
mailing and the scheme to defraud perhaps would consider the defend-
ant's concern for the subsequent mailing, but more importantly would
objectively determine whether the mailing was material or "sufficiently
closely related" to the defendant's scheme.21' The mailings' relation-
ship to the total success of the scheme was left to the dissents'
reflections.
The caveat to this doctrine, discussed and discarded as irrelevant
in Maze,'2 2 is the applicability of the crime of mail fraud despite the
mailing occurring after the scheme if it is used to lull the victims into
the defendant's scheme. United States v. Sampson"1s created this ex-
ception and United States v. Lane2 4 buttressed it.
Sampson came to the Supreme Court on direct appeal from a dis-
trict court's dismissal of thirty-four counts of mail fraud and one count
of conspiracy to commit mail fraud.21 5 The issue was the propriety of
the district court's finding that the mailings were not used for the pur-
pose of executing the fraudulent scheme.2"' The Sampson Court distin-
guished Kann and Parr, finding that "outsiders" who had no connec-
tion to the scheme dispatched the mailings in each of those
instances. 2 7 Therefore, the mailings were immaterial to the scheme "as
planned and executed by the defendants.""" In contrast, the defend-
ant in Sampson sent the mailings for the purpose of "lulling [the vic-
tims] by assurances that the promised services would be performed. M19
The Sampson opinion noted that Kann and Parr should not be con-
strued as creating an "automatic rule that a deliberate, planned use of
the mails after the victims' money had been obtained can never be 'for
210. Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705 (1989), used this term to describe the
mailings in Kann, Parr, and Maze. Id. at 714.
211. See, e.g., United States v. Holmes, 390 F. Supp. 1077, 1081 (W.D. Mo. 1975)
(granting motion to dismiss wire fraud counts using Maze's closely related test because
transmittals of money orders had nothing to do with the fraudulent scheme other than
to delay the scheme's eventual detection); see also United States v. Giovengo, 637 F.2d
941, 945 n.6 (3d Cir. 1980) (distinguishing Holmes because defendants did not use the
wires to conceal their fraud, but to complete their fraudulent scheme), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1032 (1981).
212. Maze, 414 U.S. at 403.
213. 371 U.S. 75 (1962).
214. 474 U.S. 438 (1986).
215. Sampson, 371 U.S. at 76. The conspiracy count was pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 371. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 79-80.
218. Id. at 80.
219. Id. at 81.
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the purpose of executing' the defendants' scheme. '220 Case-by-case
analysis is necessary to determine whether the defendant or outsiders
executed the mailing, whether the scheme contemplated after-the-fact
mailings, and whether the mailings served to lull the victims.
221
Justice Douglas's dissent noted that Sampson serves as a qualifier
to the prior Parr holding.222 Reading the majority opinion in a restric-
tive manner, Douglas argued that the majority had maintained a posi-
tion that "mere lulling of existing victims into a sense of security is
enough" to support a mail fraud charge.22 Subsequent jurists confirm
Douglas's reading in that the "lulling" exception is repeated while the
construction of the indictment and the insider-outsider distinction is
lost within the Sampson decision.
224
United States v. Lane225 found the United States Supreme Court
reinforcing the "lulling" exception in situations in which it is argued
that the mailings occurred after the completion of the scheme to de-
fraud. The Court rejected the Lanes' claim that there was insufficient
evidence to support several of the convictions because the mailing of
insurance claims occurred after fruition of the scheme to defraud.226
Referring to Sampson, the Lane Court concluded that the mailings
"'were designed to lull the victims into a false sense of security.' ",227
The latitude that will be afforded a jury in inferring the presence of
lulling is noted in a footnote to this opinion.228 It is only here that one
sees the Court's avoidance of the issue of what amount of proof will be
required to meet an adequate level of sufficient lulling.
229
220. Id. at 80.
221. See id. at 80-81.
222. Id. at 81 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 82.
224. See United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 403 (1974). In the recent case of
Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705 (1989), the Court makes no mention of
Sampson.
225. 474 U.S. 438 (1986).
226. Id. at 451-53.
227. Id. at 451 (quoting Maze, 414 U.S. at 403).
228. Id. at 453 n.17.
229. The Court stated:
The Lanes argue that the Government must show that the charged mailings
were specifically intended to lull, rather than showing simply a general inten-
tion on their part to defraud, in order to come within Sampson's holding. We
need not determine whether any such specific intent must be shown, as we
agree with the Court of Appeals that there was sufficient evidence for the jury
to infer specific intent to lull here under these instructions, which the Lanes
did not challenge on appeal or in their cross-petition.
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C. Schmuck v. United States
Although the recent Supreme Court decision of Schmuck v.
United States2 30 opens mail fraud's applicability even further than
Sampson and Lane's "lulling" exception, it fails to incorporate any of
the language or reference to either of these prior opinions.231 The
Schmuck case condenses the four limitations on the charge of mail
fraud into one test, that being "whether the mailing is part of the exe-
cution of the scheme as conceived by the perpetrator at the time.
'232
Irrelevant, in consideration of whether the mailing is in furtherance of
the scheme, is the counterproductivity of the mailing, the timing of the
mailing being either before or after the scheme to defraud, and the
routine nature of the mailing.233 Lost to history are the four limitations
previously used by defense counsel to preclude the prosecution's use of
a mail fraud charge.
On August 23, 1983, Wayne T. Schmuck was indicted on twelve
counts of mail fraud.234 The indictment, filed in the Western District of
Wisconsin, alleged that Schmuck, doing business in the name of Big
Foot Auto Sales, devised a scheme to defraud Wisconsin customers by
selling vehicles with rolled-back odometers to Wisconsin automobile
dealers.2 35 The fraud included selling the automobiles at artificially in-
flated prices because of the altered low-mileage odometer readings.
The specific mailings were twelve title application forms submitted by
the dealers, on behalf of their customers, to the Wisconsin Department
of Transportation. 23  Although the indictment did not charge Schmuck
with personally mailing the applications, it did accuse him of causing
the dealers to mail these letters.
2 37
Prior to trial, defendant Schmuck filed a motion to dismiss his in-
dictment in which he claimed that the mailings were not in furtherance
230. 489 U.S. 705 (1989).
231. In addition to Schmuck failing to cite or even mention the Sampson and Lane
cases, the Schmuck Court overlooked the requirement that the mailing be dispatched by
an insider as described in Sampson. Perhaps the Schmuck Court's failure to note the
distinction between insiders and outsiders is because the people who executed the mail-
ings in Schmuck might be considered outsiders. If the Court had used Sampson's rea-
soning, the holding of Schmuck may have been different.
232. Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 715.
233. See id. at 711-15.
234. Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7-8, Schmuck (No. 87-6431).
235. Id. at app. XLII.
236. Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 707.
237. The indictment alleged that Schmuck caused the twelve applications "to be
delivered by mail. . . to the Wisconsin Department of Transportation." Petitioner's Pe-
tition for Writ of Certiorari at app. XLIV, Schmuck (No. 87-6431).
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of the scheme. He relied upon Maze as the basis for his motion. 2 8 The
district court stated that "the indictment is sufficient if it merely al-
leges that the mailings were caused by the defendant" in order to exe-
cute his scheme. Thus, it rejected the motion to dismiss, finding that
the jury should decide whether the mailings were in furtherance of the
scheme to defraud.239
The jury convicted Schmuck on all twelve counts of mail fraud.
240
This conviction initially was reversed by the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, which found that the trial court improperly denied Schmuck's
request for an instruction on odometer tampering, an alleged lesser in-
cluded offense.2 4' Although the Seventh Circuit initially reversed on
the lesser included offense issue, the court approved of the jury's find-
ing that the mailings were in furtherance of the scheme to defraud. 24 2
Three months later, on petition for rehearing, the Seventh Circuit
vacated the ruling of the three judge panel. The court granted a re-
hearing en banc to revisit the issue of whether odometer tampering is a
lesser included offense of mail fraud.2 4' Although the case was reheard
en banc on June 9, 1986, the court did not issue its decision until Janu-
ary 21, 1988.244 In contrast to the earlier ruling of the three judge
panel, the court affirmed the trial court's convictions. Despite the
court's rejection of the three-judge panel's ruling on the issue of lesser
included offenses, the full court adopted the segment of the initial rul-
ing that found the mailings to be in furtherance of the scheme to
238. Id. at app. XLVI (order denying motion to dismiss indictment). In denying
Schmuck's motion to dismiss, the trial judge reasoned that "mailings which actually en-
hance the probability of detection are not within the purview of the statute." Id. (citing
United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974)).
239. Id. at app. XLVII.
240. Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 708.
241. Id.
242. United States v. Schmuck, 776 F.2d 1368, 1369 (7th Cir. 1985), vacated en
banc, 784 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1986), afl'd en banc, 840 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1988), aff'd, 489
U.S. 705 (1989). The court held that it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that the
"in furtherance" element of the crime was satisfied. The court relied upon its earlier
decision in United States v. Galloway, 664 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 1006 (1982). In Galloway the court found that a rational trier of fact could convict
for mail fraud when the mailings were made by third party retailers of an odometer
tampering scheme. Id. at 163-65. The Seventh Circuit also relied on Pereira v. United
States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954), for the proposition that a person causes a mailing when an
individual "'does an act with knowledge that the use of the mails will follow in the
ordinary course of business, or where such use can reasonably be foreseen.'" Schnuck,
776 F.2d at 1370 (quoting Pereira, 347 U.S. at 8-9).
243. United States v. Schmuck, 784 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1986) (en banc), afl'd en
banc, 840 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1988), aff'd, 489 U.S. 705 (1989).
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defraud. 215
Schmuck thereafter petitioned the United States Supreme Court
for a writ of certiorari. Central to this writ was his argument that the
district court erred in failing to give a lesser included offense instruc-
tion on odometer tampering.246 The petitioner, however, also reasserted
his position that the Maze doctrine would be dissipated if the Court
accepted that these mailings were in furtherance of the scheme to de-
fraud.247 He asserted that, as a matter of law, the mailing of the title
documents "were counterproductive to his scheme, or at most routine
mailings, intrinsically innocent.
'248
In petitioner's brief to the United States Supreme Court, he ar-
gued at length that mail fraud was inapplicable to mailings that had
occurred after the fraudulent schemes had reached fruition.
49
Schmuck emphasized the routine nature of these mailings, which he
claimed were analogous to those presented and rejected by the Court
in Parr.
2 0
The Government's response to Schmuck's allegations on this issue
245. Id. at 385. The court found that a lesser offense should be included "only when
the elements of the lesser offense form a subset of the elements of the charged offense."
Id. at 387. However, two judges argued in a dissenting opinion that the trial judge should
have granted the defendant's requested jury charge on the lesser offense of odometer
tampering. The dissent noted that the jury could have acquitted the defendant of mail
fraud if it found the mailings to be counterproductive to the scheme and therefore not in
furtherance of the scheme. Id. at 394 (Flaum, J., dissenting) (Cudahy, J., joining in dis-
sent). Thus, the odometer tampering could still have been proved despite the inability to
prove mail fraud.
246. Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14-19, Schmuck (No. 87-6431).
The petitioner argued that one should employ an "inherent relationship test" as opposed
to an "elements test" when deciding whether a crime is a lesser offense of the charged
crime. Id.
247. Id. at 20-22.
248. Id. at 20. He noted that the same argument was rejected by the Seventh Circuit
in United States v. Galloway, 664 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1006
(1982), but argued that the Supreme Court should accept the dissenting opinion in Gal-
loway. In his dissent Judge Swygert argued that the mailings were routine mailings in
accordance with Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370 (1960). Additionally, Judge Swygert
argued that according to United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974), and Kann v. United
States, 323 U.S. 88 (1944), the mailings in the instant case occurred after the scheme to
defraud. Galloway, 664 F.2d at 166-69 (Swygert, J., dissenting). The dissent also con-
tended that like Maze, the mailings in Galloway were "'not sufficiently closely related'"
to the scheme. Id. at 168 (quoting United States v. Tarnopol, 561 F.2d 466, 472 (3d Cir.
1977)).
249. Petitioner's Brief at 11-13, Schmuck (No. 87-6431). Using the cases of Kann v.
United States, 323 U.S. 88'(1944), and United States v. Kenofskey, 243 U.S. 440 (1917),
the petitioner argued that the fraudulent scheme had reached fruition prior to the execu-
tion of the mailings. Petitioner's Brief at 12-13, Schmuck (No. 87-6431).
250. Petitioner's Brief at 21, Schmuck (No. 87-6431).
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began with a claim that routine mailings can serve as mailings in exe-
cution of a scheme to defraud. 251 Additionally, the Government argued
that the scheme had not reached fruition in that the mailing served the
purpose of helping to promote the overall fraudulent plan. 52 Endors-
ing Lane and Sampson's pronouncement that mailings which lull the
victims fall within the statute, the Government stated that Schmuck's
actions were distinguished from those present in Parr, Maze, and
Kann in that they were "'incident to an essential part'" of petitioner's
fraudulent scheme.2 53 Since the retail customers and not the automo-
bile dealers were the ultimate victims of the fraudulent scheme, the
mailing of the documents to obtain titles was a necessary part of the
total scheme.
254
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's con-
victions on March 22, 1989.255 Although the majority of the Court ac-
cepted the Government's position on the "in furtherance" issue, the
Court rejected the rationale provided by the Solicitor General's Office
in its brief. The Court refused to embrace the "lulling" exception of
Sampson and Lane as the premise for upholding the convictions. The
Court factually distinguished Kann, Parr, and Maze's prior holdings
that mailings are insufficient when they occur after fruition of the
scheme to defraud. The Court found that the mailings in Kann, Parr,
and Maze "involved little more than post-fraud accounting" in which
"the long-term success of the fraud did not turn on which of the poten-
tial victims bore the ultimate loss. ''256 The ultimate test, enunciated by
the Court, is" whether the "mailing is part of the execution of the
scheme as conceived by the perpetrator at the time.)
257
Noticeably apparent is the resemblance of this new test to the dis-
senting arguments presented in the prior cases of Kann, Parr, and
251. Respondent's Brief at 10, Schmuck (No. 87-6431). Respondent cited instances
of routine mailings that have been upheld in mail fraud convictions. See, e.g., Carpenter
v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (mailing newspapers in furtherance of a scheme).
The Government noted that it is hard to imagine a more routine mailing than the mail-
ing of copies of the Wall Street Journal as was the case in Carpenter. Respondent's
Brief at 11, Schmuck (No. 87-6431).
252. Respondent's Brief at 17, Schmuck (No. 87-6431).
253. Id. at 19.
254. Petitioner Schmuck argued in his Reply Brief that this assertion by the Gov-
ernment is not supported by the indictment and evidence in the case. Specifically,
Schmuck cited paragraph nine of the indictment which charged that "'the Wisconsin
dealers and the Wisconsin customers would and did rely on the false odometer mile-
age.'" Reply Brief of Petitioner at 4, Schmuck (No. 87-6431).
255. Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705 (1989).
256. Id. at 714.
257. Id. at 715.
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Maze.258 The majority in Schmuck chose to proceed with a subjective
examination of the scheme as a totality, as opposed to an objective
inquiry into whether the mailings were after the fact.25
This new approach was rebuked by a forceful four-person dis-
sent.2 0 Justice Scalia, the author of the dissenting opinion, in high-
lighting the majority's premise that a scheme should be examined by
combining all the individual transactions into one ongoing entity,
noted how this "identical" proposition 261 was rejected by the majority
in Kann.262 To accept the majority view, the dissenters contended,
would result in mail fraud becoming a crime of "mail" and "fraud" as
opposed to mailings that are "in furtherance of the fraud."263 Justice
Scalia chastised the majority for disregarding precedent and concluded





D. After Schmuck v. United States
As predicted in the dissent, the Schmuck case has left courts in a
state of confusion. Interpretations of this decision have reached con-
flicting results, with the conflict oftentimes resting on the proper inter-
pretation of Schmuck, as opposed to the factual distinctions of each
new case.2 15 Oddly enough, although Schmuck serves to broaden the
crime of mail fraud, one finds that some lower courts are reading the
letters that have now been opened. In so reading these letters, sum-
mary approval of Schmuck is not always apparent.
Schmuck has been cited by courts in both criminal266 and civil ac-
tionS26 7 to reinforce the position that a mail fraud action can be predi-
258. However, the Court did not cite the dissenting opinions of those three deci-
sions. Instead, the Court implied that its new test was based upon the majority opinions
in Kann, Parr, and Maze. See id.
259. Id. at 714-15.
260. Id. at 722-25 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor
joined in Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion.
261. Id. at 723.
262. Id. at 723-25 (citing Kann v. United States, 323 U.S. 88 (1944)). In his dissent-
ing opinion in Kann, Justice Douglas noted the continuing nature of the fraudulent ven-
ture in that case, and the fact that the mailings were crucial to the total success of the
fraudulent project. Kann, 323 U.S. at 96 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also supra notes
177-88 and accompanying text (discussing Kann).
263. Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 723 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
264. Id. at 725.
265. See, e.g., United States v. Pacheco-Ortiz, 889 F.2d 301 (1st Cir. 1989) (per
curiam) (affirming two counts of aiding and abetting mail fraud and reversing one).
266. See United States v. Shyres, 898 F.2d 647, 652 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 69 (1990).
267. See Dana Corp. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Mut., 900 F.2d 882, 886 (6th Cir.
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cated upon routine mailings. Whether the mailing is a legitimate in-
voice268 or a bill required by a contract, as long as the mailing is
incidental to an essential aspect of the scheme, it is sufficient.289 One
court cited Schmuck to express the view that the mailing requirement
of mail fraud is now easily satisfied.
270
Schmuck also has been used to demonstrate the unacceptability of
arguments that a mailing is not in furtherance of the scheme if it is
counterproductive to the fraudulent scheme.27 1 The fact that the mail-
ing may have hindered the scheme by making it more difficult to reap
the illegal benefits of the scheme is irrelevant. Prior cases that found a
limitation to mail fraud based upon the conflicting nature of the mail-
ing to the scheme are no longer acceptable precedent to some courts.2 72
But not all courts after Schmuck are quick to discard prior prece-
dent. For instance, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals cited Schmuck
in a footnote, but described a test that more aptly fit the manner in
which Kann, Parr, and Maze were employed.2 7 3 Although the court re-
versed a mail fraud conviction because of an improper indictment, the
court sua sponte alerted defense counsel to. the Schmuck case. The
court provided the defendant with the ammunition to prompt him to
request the dismissal of the mail fraud charges on remand. This refer-
ence to Schmuck is predicated, however, upon the belief that mailings
of cancelled checks by a bank are after-the-fact mailings and therefore
are insufficient as mailings in furtherance of the scheme to defraud.
1990). Mail fraud applies to civil cases in that it serves as a predicate act in a RICO
action. RICO may be brought as a civil action pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1988). Pri-
vate individuals that bring civil RICO actions may recover treble damages. Id. § 1964(c).
268. Shyres, 898 F.2d at 652.
269. Dana, 900 F.2d at 886.
270. Reynolds v. East Dyer Dev. Co., 882 F.2d 1249, 1252 (7th Cir. 1989). The court
dismissed a civil RICO action, which contained mail fraud as a predicate offense, and
noted that because the mailing aspect is now so easily satisfied, courts must be cautious
and recognize that not all conduct that is unethical should be considered a scheme or
artifice to defraud. The court stated that "such a broad meaning of fraud for the mail
and wire fraud statutes 'would put federal judges in the business of creating what in
effect would be common law crimes, i.e., crimes not defined by statute.'" Id. (quoting
United States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 304, 309 (7th Cir.), vacated, 484 U.S. 807 (mem.),
rev'd, 840 F.2d. 1343 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1035 (1988)).
271. United States v. Kuzniar, 881 F.2d 466, 472-73 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that a
mailing which hinders the fraudulent scheme by making it difficult for defendants to
collect insurance proceeds was not a sufficient ground for acquittal on mail fraud
charges).
272. Id. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals cited to Schmuck's holding that
"[t]he mail fraud statute includes no guarantee that the use of the mails for the purpose
of executing a fraudulent scheme will be risk free.'" Id. (quoting Schnuck v. United
States, 489 U.S. 705, 715 (1989)).
273. United States v. Soriano, 880 F.2d 192, 197 n.8 (9th Cir. 1989).
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The "totality of the scheme" test formulated in Schmuck was omitted
from this footnote. Likewise, the court did not discuss the issue of
whether the perpetrator conceived of the scheme.274 The court's nota-
tion thus appears to interpret Schmuck as a limit to after-the-fact
mailings.
The differing interpretations of Schmuck are not limited to resolu-
tions of all issues. Ambiguity still exists. One case noted that Schmuck
failed to decide the question of whether the same party must be
deceived and injured in order to sustain a mail fraud charge.
275
Several courts have chosen to carefully scrutinize mall fraud cases
in light of the Schmuck decision.27 '6 These courts cited Schmuck, but
then proceeded to objectively review whether the Government pro-
vided sufficient evidence of mailings that advanced the scheme to de-
fraud. Unlike the Court in Schmuck, these courts are unwilling to take
at face value the Government's contention that after-the-fact mailings
can promote the overall fraudulent scheme. Schmuck's statement that
a rational jury could have found that the defendant was not indifferent
to who bore the ultimate loss 277 is dissipated by subsequent cases that
require affirmative proof by the Government.
For example, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 278 reversed mail
fraud convictions despite the Government's contention that the mail-
ing of invoices, involving multiple suppliers of pipe, was analogous to
Schmuck's venture which "'depended upon his continued harmonious
relations with and good reputation among retail dealers.' ",279 The court
agreed that employing an "overall scheme" theory can provide a basis
for a mail fraud conviction. The court held, however, that the Govern-
ment needed to "demonstrate how such mailings advanced or were in-
tegral to the fraud."280 Without such a showing, there could be no ju-
risdictional component of this federal criminal offense.
281
Oddly enough, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals did not consider
the possibility that the jury may have inferred that the defendant in-
tended the mailing to be part of the execution of the total scheme. The
274. Id.
275. Corcoran v. American Plan Corp., 886 F.2d 16, 20 n.5 (2d Cir. 1989) (civil RICO
case with mail fraud as predicate offense).
276. See United States v. Pacheco-Ortiz, 889 F.2d 301 (1st Cir. 1989) (per curiam);
Robert Suris Gen. Contractor Corp. v. New Metro. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 873 F.2d
1401 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Vontsteen, 872 F.2d 626 (5th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 801 (1991).
277. Sclunuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 711-12 (1989).
278. United States v. Vontsteen, 872 F.2d 626 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 801 (1991).
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court placed the "totality of the scheme" test of Schmuck in a footnote
to the decision, s22 but employed an objective analysis to determine if
there was any evidence to support the conviction.2 8 Finding none and
unwilling to consider the possibility that this evidence could be in-
ferred from other evidence presented to the jury, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the mail fraud convictions.8 4
This type of examination is not endemic to the Fifth Circuit in
that the First Circuit Court of Appeals also has reversed one count of
mail fraud by citing the Schmuck case.2 8 5 The court found two counts
of mall fraud satisfactory in that they were closely related to the pur-
pose of the scheme. The court reversed the conviction on the third
count, however, because it played no "part of the planned execution of
the scheme and appeared only to enhance the prospects that the
scheme would be uncovered. '288 It is ironic that the First Circuit Court
of Appeals used a counterproductivity argument and cited to Schmuck,
which found counterproductivity irrelevant. It is likewise ironic to see
the citation to Schmuck following a reference to the closely related test
of Maze.2 17 One can only surmise that some courts are reluctant to ap-
ply Schmuck expansively. Rather, adhering to Kann and Maze, these
courts prefer to strictly interpret the extent to which the holding in
Schmuck should be applied.
E. Status Today
The Schmuck decision permits trial courts to instruct the jury
that a mailing is in furtherance of the scheme to defraud when the
defendant perceives that the mailing is part of the execution of the
fraudulent scheme. It also tolerates a court's refusal to instruct a jury
on the four limitations to a mailing being in furtherance of the scheme
to defraud. Subjective scrutiny of the defendant's intent becomes a
question of fact within the province of the jury.
In actuality, however, courts have long held that juries may infer a
282. Id. at 628 n.3.
283. Id. at 629.
284. Id. The Eleventh Circuit likewise found a mail fraud count improper when it
was being used as the predicate offense for a civil RICO case. The appellate court found
"no evidence ... that the mailings were in any way incident to or part of the execution
of some particular nefarious scheme." Robert Suris Gen. Contractor Corp. v. New Metro.
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 873 F.2d 1401, 1406 (11th Cir. 1989).
285. United States v. Pacheco-Ortiz, 889 F.2d 301 (1st Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
286. Id. at 306.
287. Id. The court cited both Schmuck and Maze, but seemed to employ the Maze




Podgor: Mail Fraud: Opening Letters
Published by Scholar Commons, 1992
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
defendant's intent from the evidence.2 88 Therefore, despite the reversal
of several convictions after pronouncement of the Schmuck decision, it
appears that an appellate tribunal has the option of upholding a mail
fraud conviction if the jury is permitted the opportunity to consider
the defendant's intent and resolves the question based upon inferences
from the evidence. Reversals will be relegated to the rare circumstance
in which there is no evidence to support the jury's verdict or over-
whelming evidence contrary to the jury's decision. 8 9
In contrast to the many courts that have limited mail fraud to
mailings in execution of the scheme to defraud, appellate courts now
will have little basis to contradict the jury's finding.290 The dissents,
espoused by Justices Douglas and White in decisions such as Kann and
Maze, became the prevailing view with use of a subjective test to deter-
mine when the scheme has actually terminated and whether the de-
fendant anticipated use of the mails in furtherance of that scheme.
The dissipation of the limitations on the "in furtherance" doctrine
of mail fraud serves to place additional power in the hands of the jury.
Clearly, when the fraudulent scheme is repulsive in nature, the jury
will be quick to let their sentiments prevail by returning a guilty ver-
dict. Thus, mail fraud convictions may turn on the distastefulness of
the fraud, as opposed to whether the mailing actually served to further
the fraudulent scheme.
Also lost to history as a result of Schmuck are exceptions to the
legal limitations. Lulling of victims is no longer a valid consideration
other than as a government argument that this lulling serves as eviden-
tiary proof of the defendant's intent for the mailing to be part of the
overall scheme. Additionally, whether the victim of the fraud is an out-
sider or an insider is irrelevant.
291
By condensing the "in furtherance" aspect of mail fraud into one
comprehensive test, the Court effectively has taken this crime well be-
yond its post-office origin. The Court has provided prosecutors with a
288. See ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 834-37 (3d ed.
1982).
289. See United States v. Rendini, 738 F.2d 530 (1st Cir. 1984). In Rendini the court
stated: "The jury found that the mailing of these checks was in furtherance of a scheme
to defraud. Therefore the mailings came within the scope of the mail fraud statute." Id.
at 534.
290. One possible ground may be based on an argument emanating from the legal
duty doctrine of Parr. The legal duty would arise as to mailings that were a "direct
product" of the scheme and would have occurred despite the scheme's existence. The
Supreme Court in Schmuck applied a but-for test and found Parr distinguishable in that
"the mailings in the present case, though in compliance with Wisconsin's car-registration
procedure, were derivative of Schmuck's scheme to sell 'doctored' cars and would not
have occurred but for that scheme." Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 713-14 n.7.
291. See United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75, 79 (1962).
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more accessible statute to use for crimes involving fraud. Yet, despite
the simplicity of the test recited in the Schmuck case, it is apparent
that this area of mail fraud is still riddled with confusion. Some lower
courts even appear reluctant to embrace Schmuck wholeheartedly.
A return to the four legal limitations of mail fraud would provide
some guidelines within which this offense could operate. It would pro-
vide credence to the concept of precedent and also provide boundaries
within which this criminal statute could function. Mail fraud would be
a crime that included the element of "in furtherance," as opposed to
being merely a crime requiring a mailing and a fraud." 2
V. MAIL FRAUD AS A PREDICATE ACT OF RICO
A new dimension was added to the crime of mail fraud upon the
passage of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO).2 93 RICO requires a "pattern of racketeering activity."219 The
statute describes the pattern as at least requiring the commission of
two or more specified state or federal offenses, known as predicate acts,
within a set statutory period. 95 The racketeering activities, or "predi-
cate acts," include both mail and wire fraud.
2 98
The simplicity of proof required in establishing a prima facie case
of mail fraud or wire fraud is highlighted by its titanic use as a predi-
cate offense to a charge of racketeering. Despite the fact that the RICO
statute contains a number of potential predicate offenses, including
nine state offenses29 7 and numerous federal offenses, 29 18 mail fraud is
292. The dissenters in Schmuck cautioned that liability is incurred by "mail fraud"
rather than "mail and fraud." The dissent further stated, "This federal statute is not
violated by a fraudulent scheme in which, at some point, a mailing happens to oc-
cur-nor even by one in which a mailing predictably and necessarily occurs." Schmuck,
489 U.S. at 723 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
293. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968 (West 1984 & Supp. 1991).
294. Id. § 1962. The statute states that a "pattern of racketeering activity requires
at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of
this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of
imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of the racketeering activity." 18
U.S.C.A. § 1961(5) (West 1984).
295. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1), (5) (West 1984 & Supp. 1991). "Unlike other provisions
in § 1961 that tell us what various concepts used in the Act 'mean,' 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5)
says of the phrase 'pattern of racketeering activity' only that it 'requires at least two acts
of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after [October 15, 1970,] and the last of
which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the com-
mission of a prior act of racketeering activity.'" H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
492 U.S. 229, 237 (1989) (brackets supplied by Court) (holding that a pattern requires
continuity plus relationship).
296. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1) (West Supp. 1991).
297. The state offenses include "any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping,
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the Government's most commonly used predicate act to a RICO
charge. Its use is seen not only in criminal actions of racketeering, but
also in civil RICO cases.
299
The ramifications of using mail fraud as a predicate to RICO in a
gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in nar-
cotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year." Id. § 1961(1)(A).
298. The federal offenses include:
(B) any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18,
United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to
sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section
659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under sec-
tion 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement from pension and
welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relating to extortionate credit transactions),
section 1029 (relative to fraud and related activity in connection with access
devices), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling information),
section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), sec-
tion 1344 (relating to financial institution fraud), sections 1461-1465 (relating
to obscene matter), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section
1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating
to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section 1512 (relating to
tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant), section 1513 (relating to
retaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant), section 1951 (relating to
interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to
racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering
paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments), sec-
tion 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), section
1956 (relating to the laundering of monetary instruments), section 1957 (relat-
ing to engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified
unlawful activity), section 1958 (relating to use of interstate commerce facili-
ties in the commission of murder-for-hire), sections 2312 and 2313 (relating to
interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles), sections 2314 and 2315 (re-
lating to interstate transportation of stolen property), section 2321 (relating to
trafficking in certain motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts), sections 2341-2346
(relating to trafficking in contraband cigarettes), sections 2421-24 (relating to
white slave traffic), (C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United
States Code, section 186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to
labor organizations) or section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union
funds), (D) any offense involving fraud connected with a case under title 11,
fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, re-
ceiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other
dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the United States, or (E) any act
which is indictable under the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting
Act.
Id. § 1961(1).
299. See NORMAN ABRAMS, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW 271 (1986) ("[M]all fraud. . . is
the most frequently used predicate offense in civil RICO cases."); see also Susan
Getzendanner, Judicial "Pruning" of "Garden Variety Fraud" Civil RICO Cases Does
Not Work: It's Time for Congress to Act, 43 VAND. L. REV. 673, 678 (1990) ("The vast
majority of civil RICO cases use mail, wire, or securities fraud as the predicate offense.").
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criminal case are noted from a sentencing perspective.30 0 Mail fraud
carries a penalty of five years and a fine of one thousand dollars.
3 0 1
This sentence, however, may be enhanced when the violation affects a
financial institution. In reacting to the savings and loan crisis, Congress
increased mail fraud's penalties to a maximum fine of one million dol-
lars and up to thirty years imprisonment when the fraud relates to a
financial institution.3 0 2 In contrast to the classic mail fraud conviction,
RICO carries a penalty of twenty years, a fine, and forfeiture of prop-
erty.301 Thus, conviction -on RICO charges with a mail fraud predicate
not only labels the defendant as a racketeer,0 4 but also can signifi-
cantly raise the stakes of possible punishment.
The penalty consideration is not ameliorated by the new federal
sentencing guidelines. The guidelines provide a significant disparity in
sentences for these two offenses. Mail fraud is a "base six offense" 30 5
while RICO's base is the greater of a base nineteen or the offense level
of the underlying racketeering activity.3 06 The difference in these base
levels results in a possible sentence of zero to eighteen months for mail
fraud versus a sentence of thirty to seventy-eight months for RICO.
This disparity can serve as an effective plea-bargain -inducement bene-
fitting the Government.
30 7
The elevated effect of mail fraud, when used as a predicate offense
for RICO, is best exemplified by the Government's employment of the
RICO charge when the two or more predicate acts of mail fraud are
mailed tax returns.308 Not only has prosecutorial discretion chosen mail
fraud in conjunction with or as opposed to a tax fraud charge, but it
also has subjected a criminal defendant to a possible twenty-year sen-
tence for offenses that originally, as tax offenses, carried a five-year
maximum. 09  Recently, the Department of Justice restrained
prosecutorial discretion by internally limiting this application to "ex-
300. Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being A Criminal (pts. 1 & 2), 87
COLUM. L. REv. 661, 661 (1987).
301. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West Supp. 1991).
302. Id.
303. Id. § 1963. The sentence may include life imprisonment depending on the pred-
icate offense. Id.
304. See Getzendanner, supra note 299, at 685. ("No one, especially an accountant,
wants to be called a racketeer: 'We are a profession that lives on its reputation.' ").
305. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2.F1.1(a) (1990).
306. Id. § 2.El.l(a).
307. See id. ch. 5, at 1 (stating that the sentence may vary depending on factors
such as the character of the offender).
308. See generally Podgor, supra note 19 (outlining prosecutor's use of RICO in
mail fraud actions).
309. It should be noted that tax offenses, unlike mail and wire fraud, are not predi-
cate acts of a RICO charge. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1) (West Supp. 1991).
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ceptional circumstance[s]." 310 This guideline does not, however, totally
preclude future application of RICO when the offense is a fraudulently
mailed tax return. n
Mail fraud's elasticity is best seen in the tax offense area. Unlike
mail fraud, tax offenses are not included as predicate acts for a RICO
charge. Therefore, by calling the fraudulently filed returns mail fraud
as opposed to tax fraud, the prosecution accomplishes penalty en-
hancement for an offense that Congress never even considered during
the enactment of the statutory crimes of mail fraud or RICO. Addi-
tionally, by calling the offense mail fraud, as opposed to tax fraud, the
Government reduces its burden of proof by eliminating the "willful-
ness" requirement in a tax fraud charge and circumvents the burden-
some administrative process afforded a defendant in an Internal Reve-
nue investigation.
312
Mail fraud is not only a basis of criminal prosecution, but by be-
coming a predicate act to RICO, it has entered the civil arena. Here,
there are no Justice Department guidelines to limit the pervasiveness
of the statute.31 3 Civil RICO has been the subject of significant contro-
versy, and revisions have been proposed for legislative consideration.314
310. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 161, § 6-4.211(1).
311. See United States v. Regan, 726 F. Supp. 447, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding
that new tax fraud guidelines "[do] not bar this or future tax .fraud and mail fraud
charges from being brought under the RICO statute"), affld in part and vacated in part,
937 F.2d 823 (2d Cir.), amended, 946 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1991).
312. See Podgor, supra note 19, at 925. A defendant in a tax case is entitled to an
instruction that a jury should examine the defendant's subjective intent on the issue of
"wilfulness." A good faith reliance by the defendant can negate criminal liability. See
Cheek v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 604 (1991). But see United States v. Gelb, 700 F.2d
875, 879 (2d Cir.) (holding that mail and wire fraud are more onerous in proof because
they are specific intent crimes), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 853 (1983).
313. In rare instances, however, a judge will take action to restrain counsel's im-
proper use of the RICO statute. A federal judge in Louisiana chose to sanction the attor-
neys who filed a RICO action that "took ... the open-ended RICO laws too far." Frank
Polozola, Making RICO Lawyers Pay, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 1991, at A22, col. 1.
314. See G. Robert Blakey & Thomas A. Perry, An Analysis of the Myths That
Bolster Efforts to Rewrite RICO and the Various Proposals for Reform: "Mother of
God-Is This the End of RICO?", 43 VAND. L. REV. 851, 1049-1101 (1990) (proposed
sample legislation); John Conyers, Jr., RICO Reform a Second Windfall for S & L'
Crooks, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1990, at A17, col. 1 (arguing against reform); Stephen
Labaton, House Panel Backs Easing of RICO Law, N.Y. Tims, May 3, 1991, at D8, col.
4 (reporting that a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee approved a bill that
would limit RICO's civil application, and critics argued that RICO was the only means
by which the Government and plaintiffs could reach white-collar criminals); Timothy
Noah, Bill to Limit RICO Lawsuits Moves Forward, WALL ST. J., May 3, 1991, at A78,
col. 3 (reporting that a House subcommittee approved a reform bill, but the bill's future
was uncertain); The RICO "Reformers" Are Back Again, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 24, 1990, at
A18, col. 1 (editorial) (warning against reform).
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This criticism of civil RICO, however, fails to focus on the crux of the
problem. 1 ' But for mail and wire fraud's breadth, civil RICO would
have minimal application. It is through the spaciousness of the
"scheme to defraud" element of mail fraud3 1 6 that RICO has degener-
ated to permit "garden variety frauds" that have little bearing on the
eradication of organized crime,' 7 the legislative intent at the time of
the statute's inauguration.31 8 Although fraudulent acts traditionally
have been subject to civil penalties,3 1 9 their inclusion in RICO actions
extends the possible penalties to a "draconian" level.3 20 The elimina-
tion of mail and wire fraud as predicate offenses to civil RICO would
assist in restoring the statute to its intended purpose of fighting organ-
ized crime. At a minimum, a clear definition of mail fraud's "scheme to
defraud" element is necessary in order to curb its seemingly endless
application.
32 1
VI. RESTRUCTURING THE CRIME OF MAIL FRAUD
Mail fraud was passed as one minor section in the recodification of
the Postal Act. It was passed with little thought and no debate. The
revisions to this statute likewise have not been the subject of signifi-
cant controversy. Yet, despite the fact that the statutory offense re-
ceived inconsiderable comment from the legislature, it has been perva-
sively used by the Government and thus been the subject of significant
315. Some believe that RICO should not be modified in any manner. Indeed, some
have alleged that the reformers are actually "targets of thrift, securities, commodities
and insurance investigations." See No Time for RICO "Reform", N.Y. Tias, July 21,
1990, § 1, at 20, col. 1 (editorial).
316. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West Supp. 1991).
317. See Getzendanner, supra note 299, at 679.
318. RICO was passed as a blueprint to fight organized crime. See Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (current version at 18
U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968 (West 1984 & Supp. 1991)).
319. In response to Professor Abrams's gatekeeper approach, see Norman Abrams,
A New Proposal for Limiting Private Civil RICO, 37 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2 (1989), Professor
Goldsmith and Mark Linderman argued that the jurisprudence of RICO is not unique in
using a civil action to assist in criminal enforcement. They cited wrongful death and civil
conversion actions as examples. Michael Goldsmith & Mark J. Linderman, Civil RICO
Reform: The Gatekeeper Concept, 43 VAND. L. REv. 735, 741 (1990). Their argument
failed, however, to note the uniqueness of RICO as an action with treble damages, attor-
ney fees, and the stigma of being labeled as a racketeer.
320. See Lynch, supra note 300, at 748-58.
321. Arguments also have been presented that stress the need for a better definition
of the pattern element of a RICO charge. See Joseph E. Bauerschmidt, Note, "Mother of
Mercy-Is This the End of RICO?"--Justice Scalia Invites Constitutional Void-for-
Vagueness Challenge to RICO "Pattern", 65 NOTRE DAaiE L. REV. 1106 (1990).
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controversy in the courts. 22 Central to the discord has been what in-
terpretation courts should give to the words of this statute 2 and
whether such construction should permit the Government to use a
charge of mail fraud when the alleged criminal activity is directly cov-
ered by another criminal statute.3 2
In the earlier years the broad and literal variance was manifested
by some courts requiring the scheme to be specifically listed in the
statute,3 25 while others were satisfied with using mail fraud to reach
new crimes omitted as criminal from portions of other statutes. 32 Dif-
fering views existed throughout history with respect to the nexus re-
quirement between the mailing and the scheme to defraud. Limitations
to the "in furtherance" aspect of the crime of mail fraud arose and
were eliminated, oftentimes in five-to-four Supreme Court opinions.
3 27
At the apex of the confusion we see a case like McNally v. United
States,3 2 8 in which a seven-to-two Court haggles over the correct gram-
matical reading of the terms within the statute. In McNally legal
scholars debated whether a conjunctive or disjunctive reading was
proper and, in resolving the issue, they effectively devastated numer-
ous convictions.
3 2 s
It is without doubt apparent that the fluctuation of interpretation
has existed despite five revisions to the statute. It is also evident that,
even today, mail fraud's elements hang on the threads of the present
322. One controversy, not discussed in this Article, is the effect of the mail fraud
statute on the First Amendment right to free speech. See generally Peter T. Barbur,
Note, Mail Fraud and Free Speech, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 942 (1986) (arguing that the Third
Circuit's analysis of mail fraud seriously threatens public speech).
323. It is arguable that many statutes have an element of unclarity and that vague
words within a statute are merely the essence of the interpretive function of the courts.
Clearly the mail fraud statute is not a statute that enforces itself. See RONALD DWORIUN,
LAW'S EMPIRE 313-54 (1986).
324. Prosecutors also have chosen to use mail fraud in conjunction with other crimi-
nal offenses, thereby increasing the Government's bargaining strength and conviction
rate. See, e.g., United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595, 599 (7th Cir. 1978) (noting
the longstanding use of mail fraud in concert with statutes that prohibit the making of
false statements to governmental agencies).
325. See, e.g., United States v. Owens, 17 F. 72 (E.D. Mo. 1883) (stating that a mail
fraud statute is not applicable to commercial correspondence solely between a debtor
and creditor); see also Rakoff, supra note 2, at 790-95 (discussing cases using the literal
approach).
326. See, e.g., United States v. Horman, 118 F. 780 (S.D. Ohio 1901), aft'd, 116 F.
350 (6th Cir. 1902) (stating that the mail fraud statute is applicable to blackmail and
blackmail is a scheme to defraud), cert. denied, 187 U.S. 641 (1902).
327. For a discussion of the "in furtherance" element of mail fraud, see supra notes
37-46, 107-292 and accompanying text.
328. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
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five-to-four majority in the Court. Meanwhile, despite legal scholars
being unable to predict the future interpretation of the mail fraud stat-
ute, people are being sent to jail for violation 9f the statute.3 0
The mail fraud statute's uncertainty has exceeded the bounds of
mere judicial activism"3 1 and entered the arena of absurdity. A statute
beset with legal complications as significant as those evidenced here
can only serve to fortify the public's perception of disparity, confusion,
and corruption within the legal process. Correction is therefore needed
to properly place individuals on notice of what conduct is prohibited
and to restore trust in the legal system. Recalibration of the statute is
needed to provide consistency and predictability in the translation of
the statute's language to actual cases.
This restructuring needs to be an action of our legislature, as op-
posed to the judiciary. "Adjudication is different from legislation.
33 2
Yet presently the court serves as the legislator, as opposed to adjudica-
tor, when a mail fraud issue is the subject of the resolution. The legis-
lative "reaction" to judicial decisions is a mere bandage to a more per-
vasive problem-a statute that lacks focus. Within the mail fraud
statute, there is neither a clear position in the traditional body of crim-
inal law,33 3 as for example with murder, nor any enacted positive law
via the legislature. Regardless of whether one promotes legislative ac-
tion following the normative principles that pervade criminal law or
merely reflects the political and moral influences of the moment,334 the
result will provide a resolution to the present ambiguity.
It would appear that the legislature has attempted, in drafting the
mail fraud statute, to create language that will serve future occurrences
of criminality ill-defined in other promulgations. In so doing, our legis-
330. The vagueness of the statute may be acceptable, however, becbuse mail fraud is
by its very nature improper. Thus, the distinction between justification (e.g., abortion
crimes) and definition (e.g., larceny offenses) is arguable. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RE-
THINKING CRIMINAL LAW 570-73 (1978). The act of mail fraud is not necessarily per se
criminal. Many mail fraud offenses are justifiable in that political interpretation of "hon-
est services" may make an offense proper in one context and improper in another. To
give courts free reign to guess on the proper interpretation deprives an individual of
proper notice of what constitutes criminal conduct.
331. DONALD E. LIVELY, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED (1990)
(discussion of court activism).
332. DWORKIN, supra note 323, at 410.
333. Fraud, absent its mailing application, has roots in the common law in the form
of deceit and misrepresentations. See Donna Maus, Comment, License Procurement and
the Federal Mail Fraud Statute, 58 U. CHL L. REV. 1125 (1991). Mail fraud is, however,
broader than the common-law fraud because misrepresentation of fact is not required to
establish a scheme to defraud pursuant to the mail fraud statute. See McEvoy Travel
Bureau, Inc. v. Heritage Travel, Inc., 904 F.2d 786 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 536
(1990).
334. FLETCHER, supra note 330, at 406-08.
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lature is treating the statutory construction from a constitutional per-
spective, as opposed to it being code or statutory in nature. That being,
the drafters are using language that "is framed for ages to come, and is
designed to approach immortality"335 as opposed to language that is
specific in nature. The lack of definitiveness to the mail fraud statute
results in terminology that glosses over the realities of the moment and
provides no guidance for construing the textual wording. This ap-
proach is clearly befitting a constitution of a nation, but fails when
meeting the immediate needs of a statute or code.
In addition to language that will provide a clearer understanding
of the scope of the crime, Congress also must modernize the statute in
order to meet the complexities of the computer age. Wire and mail
fraud need to be condensed into one formula that includes both tangi-
ble and intangible property. The drafters should include specificity
about the scope of intangible property, as well as an understanding of
what will be a sufficient nexus between the mailing and the fraud.
Ambiguous terms such as "honest services" should be deleted from
the statute and substituted by specific types of political fraud that will
be prohibited. 33 Statutory guidelines of specific conduct encompassed
by this provision are needed to preclude the possibility of political use
of this criminal statute. In an age rampant with prosecutional abuse
and zealousness, statutory specificity can serve to curtail discretion
that is used improperly.
3 37
VII. CONCLUSION
It is one thing to find the crime of mail fraud as a "stopgap" provi-
sion and leave flexibility in the statute to meet new types of fraudulent
conduct. It is another thing, however, to have a statute that is beset
with total confusion, thus permitting a court's haphazard application
dependent upon the political structure of the court.
Although some may claim that the American system of justice is
notorious for writing constitutions that will be "living documents,"" 8 it
335. ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 343 (1919).
336. For discussion of ambiguity in the term "honest services," see supra notes 82-
106 and accompanying text. The interpretive process suggested by Ronald Dworkin does
not suffice in this instance. See DWORIUN, supra note 323.
337. Overzealous prosecution often is reviewed under the harmless error doctrine.
For this reason, statutory specificity is needed to provide the parameters of permissible
conduct. See generally Ellen S. Podgor & Jeffrey S. Weiner, Prosecutorial Misconduct:
Alive & Well & Living In Indiana?, 3 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 657 (1990) (discussing possi-
ble remedies for prosecutorial misconduct); Michael E. Tigar, Mail Fraud, Morals, and
U.S. Attorneys, 11 LITIG. 22 (1984) (discussing political use of mail fraud statute).
338. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 682-83 (1952) (Vinson,
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is likewise a system in which statutes are written to provide criminal
defendants with due process of law.339 Due process requires knowledge
that the individual's actions were criminal in nature.3"° Clearly, if
members of the Supreme Court have difficulty with the terms of the
statute, the less intelligent criminal defendants will be tried, convicted,
and oftentimes punished for crimes that they clearly are unable to un-
derstand. Perhaps there is some truth to the words expressed in the
jails and prisons of the United States when incarcerated defendants
say they really are innocent.
A criminal statute that contains a political element cannot be rele-
gated to an acceptance of a "crime control" argument 3 1 that one "will
know it when [one] see[s] it."'34 2 Furthermore, the increased opening of
letters through a coupling of mail fraud with RICO necessitates imme-
diate scrutiny of this statute. Rectifying this statute is an impossibility.
The only hope for correcting the ambiguity and unjustness is for a to-
tal demolition and restructuring of the criminal offense presently
known as mail fraud. Before we give prosecutors an Uzi, let us require
that they be licensed to use it and let us likewise be 'certain that the
victims of their firings are truly guilty of a criminal offense.
C.J., dissenting).
339. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
340. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957) (reversing a conviction on
grounds that the individual did not have fair notice of a municipal ordinance that re-
quired convicted persons to register with the police).
341. See generally HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LImIrrS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 149-
73 (1968) (analyzing the criminal process under a due process model as well as a crime
control model).
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